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## Achieving the Goals of the Charter

*Address by Secretary Acheson<sup>1</sup>*

This is our first meeting in the new home of the United Nations. We join in our congratulations and gratitude to all of those who have had a part in the completion of this work. The result of their efforts is an enduring symbol of accomplishment and of aspiration.

We meet here to take up our labors to bring together and to harmonize the hopes and desires of the people of the United Nations. This is a never-ending task for each Assembly in its turn.

This year marks the seventh anniversary of the ratification of the Charter. These 7 years have demonstrated that the role of the United Nations in the community of nations is an essential one and one that will continue to increase in influence and importance in the years ahead.

The importance and influence of the United Nations is reflected in the problems that come before it. They indicate the powerful currents that make our period in history one of turbulence and change. Many of these problems will be with us for years to come. We cannot shy away from them even if we wish to do so. Our task is to face them squarely and realistically, with good faith and good sense, in the light of our joint and several responsibilities under the Charter.

Moreover, there is an interdependence between these problems. Each is made more difficult of solution by the existence of the others. We cannot solve them all at once. But we can solve some; we can chip away at others; and we can use all the resources of the United Nations to prepare the way for more effective cooperation between nations.

One of the most important of these resources is the General Assembly. There is no more representative or more influential international institution than the one in which we are now participating. The Charter entrusts the Assembly with a wide variety of tasks and an equal variety

of methods which it can employ. Three groups of problems lie before us: first, those that concern security; second, those that relate to the fulfillment of national and individual aspirations; and third, the problems that have to do with economic progress of both individuals and communities.

The chief lesson of our experience in the field of collective security is that the solidarity of the nations which support the Charter is absolutely essential. The alternative to this solidarity is the disintegration of the United Nations and the triumph of lawlessness in the world.

The program which started in 1950 with the Uniting for Peace Resolution constitutes General Assembly recognition that members of the United Nations must, by virtue of their membership, stand together and act together for the maintenance of peace.

To make this work, wholehearted cooperation is essential. The institution of the United Nations can be no stronger than its members. It is the governments and peoples of all member nations who have the responsibility to be physically prepared and to be morally resolute to concert their strength for the cause of peace.

This responsibility to cooperate must be reflected not only in readiness to participate in action undertaken by the United Nations itself but also in other ways recognized and sanctioned by the Charter. Regional and collective self-defense arrangements, entered into and developed in accordance with the Charter, are an integral part of a universal collective-security system. When individual strength and collective strength are all dedicated to the cause of peace and the purposes of the Charter, the structure of security becomes a reality.

The Secretary-General put this matter forcefully in his report to this Assembly.<sup>2</sup> "The final test of effective collective security," he said, "will always be that a sufficient number of member governments are firmly committed in their policies to

<sup>1</sup> Made before the U.N. General Assembly at New York on Oct. 16 (press release 814). Secretary Acheson is Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the seventh session of the General Assembly, which opened Oct. 14.

<sup>2</sup> U.N. docs. A/2141, A/2141/Add. 1.



join in resisting armed aggression wherever it occurs and that they have at their disposal military power strong enough to strike back with punishing effect against any aggressor nation."

This is the lesson of the past 7 years. It would be folly for us to lose sight of it.

### The Supreme Test in Korea

It is in Korea that our whole structure of collective security is meeting its supreme test. It will stand or fall upon what we do there.

The U.N. fight in Korea is the fight of every nation and every individual who values freedom. Had our nerve failed at the time of this ruthless act of aggression, these new buildings in which we meet today might already be the empty husks of our defeated hopes for this organization. Had Korea been allowed to fall to the aggressor, the words of John Donne would have applied to each one of us:

"Never send to know for whom the bell tolls;

It tolls for thee . . ."

Had the Republic of Korea been allowed to fall to the aggressor, the delegates to these Assemblies would now be looking to their left and to their right and asking which would be the next victim on the aggressor's list.

Korea is a test not only of our courage at the initial moment of decision but even more of the firmness of our will, the endurance of our courage. The aggressor, having defied the United Nations and lost, having found himself pushed back behind his initial line of attack, now counts for victory upon those of faint heart who would grow weary of the struggle.

There are moments in history when determined will through dark hours brought victory. My country's trials came at the very outset of its history. The darkest moment for the United Nations in Korea came at Pusan. We met and overcame that trial and now face the test of staying power. Ours must be the determination and the will to sustain this crucial test. I will not pretend that the burden is light. My countrymen, like those of many of you, regard with anxiety and grief its human cost. But to the question: How long shall this be? We must answer: We shall fight on as long as is necessary to stop the aggression and to restore peace and security to Korea. We shall stop fighting when an armistice on just terms has been achieved. And we shall not allow faint-heartedness or recklessness to defeat our cause, which is to defend peace.

We must convince the aggressor that continued fighting in Korea will cost him more than he can gain. This means the training and commitment of troops; it means food, clothing, matériel, money. I urge every member of the United Nations to look to its responsibility to support the common action

### The Capitol of Peace

. . . In these headquarters of the United Nations there are combined stone, glass, metal, wood, and textiles, with elements of the human heritage which the Charter promotes. Thus, "we, the peoples of the United Nations" animate our symbols with soul-stirring desire for supremacy of morality, law, and order.

These buildings are grounded physically on the rock of Manhattan; but they are established in venerable aspirations of men—Hearers and Doers of the Word—men, likened to "a wise man, who built his house upon a rock." They are founded upon the sacrifice of those who have died for the United Nations in Korea, and in the selflessness of others who, like Count Bernadotte, have given their lives to the ideal of peaceful settlement of disputes.

These buildings symbolize our faith, and our collective determination to defend human lives and extend human freedom. But these great structures would remain inert, "without works." Aggression could crush the craftsmen who have lifted these buildings of peace. Power to destroy has grown to include power to sear the cultural resources which collectively gave rise to these buildings.

However, resources of moral power can be achieved and magnificently strengthened through deeds and the spirit of the word. Better understanding of men and women in all nations is the vital necessity for unity and cooperation to maintain international peace and security through these United Nations Headquarters.

As we take our places in the General Assembly, and at the Council meetings, let us begin all our work in the name of God, for the solution of all our problems is a spiritual one.

Our collective practice of truth, justice, and friendship among nations can radiate the beam of history into every region among all peoples.

Thus, to craftsmanship we shall add statesmanship in the Capitol of Peace.

*—Remarks made on Oct. 14 by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. Representative to the U.N., on the convening of the seventh session of the General Assembly in the new U.N. Headquarters Buildings.*

in Korea and to participate in the reconstruction of that unhappy land.

The United Nations went into Korea to repel aggression and to restore peace and security. Aggression has been stopped. But despite patient and sincere efforts of U.N. negotiators, the Communists have so far rejected reasonable terms for an armistice.

This Assembly will have the opportunity to review the record of the armistice negotiations which have been proceeding over the past 15 months. The record shows that the U.N. representatives have been patient, flexible, and resourceful, always defending the principles of the Charter. We shall have an opportunity, by action at this Assembly, to demonstrate to the aggressor that we are united in purpose and firm in resolve; that we are as one in desire for a just peace and in determination to achieve it.



### A Specific Disarmament Pledge

No consideration of security can overlook the importance of the work which has been done since our last Assembly in the field of disarmament. For, even though we are no closer to a universal agreement, the Disarmament Commission set up last year has shown by its work that the obstacle to disarmament is not technical but a matter of will. Practical methods are at hand by which the possibility of aggressive warfare can be reduced and ultimately erased.

Those practical methods are not based on the fallacious idea that our safety will be insured by piecemeal pledges not to use this weapon or that weapon. All members of the United Nations have made a solemn commitment to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." This commitment is a pledge against aggression, in any form or with any weapon, against the use of armed force "save in the common interest." On behalf of my Government, I reaffirm this pledge.

We can make that pledge absolutely specific: We will not commit aggression with rifles or machine guns or tanks. We will not commit aggression with atomic bombs or any other kind of bombs. We will not commit aggression with chemical weapons or bacteriological weapons, which we have been falsely and slanderously accused of using. We will not commit aggression with any weapons or by any means. We reaffirm for all the world to hear that, pursuant to our solemn commitment under the Charter, we pledge—not just that we will avoid the use of one weapon or another—but that we will not use *any* form of force contrary to the Charter.

We reaffirm our Charter obligations to settle "international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered."

Nations committed under the Charter not to use force to impose their will on other nations should not have to maintain huge armaments to protect themselves from one another. The maintenance of huge armaments itself constitutes a danger to peace. But disarmament cannot be achieved unilaterally. It cannot be achieved by denunciation in a battle of epithets. It can be achieved only by international agreements under effective safeguards which will protect law-abiding states from the hazards of violations and evasions. Until all states with substantial armaments are willing to cooperate in effective, guaranteed disarmament, the free, law-abiding nations of the world must arm and remain armed in self-defense. But we will continue to work to achieve the fourth of the four freedoms of President Roosevelt—freedom from fear.

The United States with other members of the Disarmament Commission has sought to outline a comprehensive disarmament program with a view to reducing the possibility and fear of war. The program seeks not only the elimination of all major weapons of mass destruction, including the atomic and bacteriological, but the elimination of large mass armies. The program calls for a reduction of well over 50 percent in the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union and for comparable limitation on the armed forces of all other states. The program provides for the effective control of atomic energy to insure its use for peaceful purposes only. It provides effective safeguards to insure an open world with no secret armies and no secret weapons.

In submitting this program, we gave outlines, not details; we did not insist that ours were the only proposals that could carry out the General Assembly resolution. We submitted them for discussion and genuine negotiation. Out of negotiation, done in good faith, the General Assembly resolution could be achieved and the maximum reduction of all armed forces and armaments consistent with the avoidance of any imbalance of power dangerous to international peace in any part of the world can be made. The United States is ready to carry out such a program. We will continue earnestly and in good faith to induce others to join us toward that end. We will apply all the ingenuity and resourcefulness we can muster. If other states do the same, we can succeed.

### Aspirations of Dependent Peoples

A second group of issues lies before us—those which grow out of the legitimate aspiration of dependent peoples for a determining voice in their own affairs.

It is important to note at the outset that these matters are not issues in the sense that anyone disputes the right of a dependent people to ultimate self-government. The right is enshrined in the Charter, and the obligation to help fulfill that right rests with each of us, including each of the administering states. These states recognize that the peoples under their control must some day determine their own destinies. These states are working toward that end, just as the dependent peoples are preparing themselves for the responsibilities of self-government.

This is, I think, illustrated by the following facts: Of the 800 million people in the free world who were in the dependent category 10 years ago, some 600 million have already attained full independence. In this period a dozen new nations have emerged, and most of them are now playing an important role in the United Nations. Furthermore, rapid progress has been and is being made toward self-government for the 200 million others who

still remain in varying stages of dependency. What these facts suggest is that the differences confronting us are not differences of purpose; they are differences of method and of timing, and they can be solved through wise statesmanship.

Over 175 years ago the American people asserted and established their right to their own national life. Surely we can and do understand the similar aspirations of other people. Indeed, our record establishes this far more conclusively than any assertion I could make. Our own experience and responsibilities have also taught us the necessity for wisdom and understanding between administering powers and dependent people. For it requires understanding on both sides to solve the complicated problems which arise in preparing a people for a stable and viable self-government in the complex world of today. The result of this kind of understanding is reflected in the presence among us in this great Assembly of our colleagues from the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Burma, and Indonesia. And there is a place in this Assembly for others.

But, in the nature of things, it is not enough that the states comprising the United Nations agree on the abstract principle of self-determination and the desirability of the evolution of dependent peoples toward self-government. For we are concerned with specific situations involving the aspirations of present and future generations. In examining these situations it will inevitably appear to some that the process of fulfilling those aspirations is too long, too tortuous. By the same token, it will seem to others that the transfer of powers is going forward at too rapid a rate—that people are being called upon to govern themselves before they have attained adequate political experience and before there exists a sound economic, social, and educational basis for lasting self-government.

If the sole question were whether it was going too fast or too slow, the answer undoubtedly in most cases would be to try to find some accommodation between these two sides. This would not, of course, wholly satisfy either one. But this is the way things have to be done in reconciling conflicting views.

But in many situations this is not the only point. There is another point which is very often lost sight of in the assertions of absolutes in regard to the right to self-rule. The fact we are apt to overlook is the deep economic interdependence between the parties. It would be utterly destructive to the interests of both if the solution were made on the basis of theoretical absolutes. If people can harmonize their views and then work a little faster or a little slower together, then their mutual dependence becomes a factor which helps to bring the matter to solution.

This fact is reflected in the evolution of formerly non-self-governing peoples. While some have chosen to move toward complete independence,

many others have chosen an independent position within a commonwealth or union, and still others have chosen to identify themselves in some other form of association with another state or group of states.

What is the proper role of the United Nations in these matters? When specific disagreements arise as to the adequacy of the progress being made by a dependent people toward self-government, the responsibility for settling such matters lies in the first instance with those immediately concerned. This is not to say, however, that the United Nations is without responsibility to assist in the achievement of peaceful solutions. On the contrary, the United Nations would be derelict in its duty if it failed to be concerned with the rate of progress toward the Charter goals being made by those states—including the United States—which hold in trust the futures of dependent peoples.

But it follows from what I have said before that the role to be played by the General Assembly should in most situations of this kind be one of accommodation. These are not cases in which it is the function of the General Assembly to impose settlements upon the parties involved. Here it is rather the primary function of the United Nations to create an atmosphere favorable to settlements which accord with Charter principles but which should be worked out by the parties directly concerned.

Various articles of the Charter employ different terms to indicate the type of action which the General Assembly may take—it may “discuss,” “consider,” “recommend,” or “decide.” As we review our 7 years of experience, it sometimes seems that we have felt that we are bound to “recommend” whenever we “consider” or “discuss.” But the Charter does not assume this to be true, nor should we do so. We must always seek solutions but not necessarily resolutions. Calm and dispassionate consideration and discussion may in such matters as these be the Assembly’s most useful contribution toward a solution.

The United Nations has a twofold interest in encouraging and assisting peaceful and orderly transition toward self-government. First, it serves to assure that the aspirations of the people involved will find constructive and genuine fulfillment. Second, it represents the general interest of the rest of the world in peaceful settlements and orderly progress—all except those who are more interested in the exploitation of differences than in genuine solutions.

The unfortunate fact is that we cannot approach this problem, or indeed any other problem before this Assembly, without being mindful of the events that are taking place in another part of the world. There, whole nations have been swallowed up and submerged by a new colonialism. Others have been reduced to a state of servile dependence. The tragic events behind this dark boundary not

only are in stark contrast with the evolutionary process toward self-government which we have been discussing, but they are so fraught with danger to all of us that we can never afford to forget them.

I have touched briefly upon the role of the United Nations with respect to the conflicts which inevitably arise in the evolution of dependent peoples toward full self-government. But much of what I have said is equally applicable in my judgment to other problems of great moment and great delicacy with which the Assembly is currently confronted.

#### **U.N. Promotion of Individual Human Rights**

I refer particularly to the role to be played by the United Nations—and especially the General Assembly—in the promotion of those individual human rights recognized by the Charter.

Our starting point is the Charter obligation assumed by all of us, as individual states and as participants in the work of the United Nations, to promote the fundamental rights of those within our jurisdiction.

To carry out this obligation faithfully means several things. It means, first of all, that we must look facts in the face. It means that we must examine our own conduct and that of other states with candor and that we cannot condone deeds which do not square with the articles of democratic faith embodied in our Charter. I venture to suggest that in the field of human rights no state represented here is wholly without fault. In our closets each of us can find the skeletons of racial, class, or religious discrimination. If this is so, it neither justifies being sanctimonious about our neighbors' faults nor being tolerant of violations of Charter obligations. We must approach these problems soberly and without hypocrisy, mindful of our human weaknesses but unremitting in our determination to fulfill our promises.

If our first job is to be honest about the facts, our second job is to be honest about the remedies available to us. The teachings of Confucius and Mohammed, of Moses, of Buddha, and of Christ will not gain instant and universal acceptance merely because they are echoed in our official pronouncements.

But the fact that we are limited in what we can accomplish does not mean we can abdicate the field. On the contrary, we would betray the basic tenets of human decency if we came to regard the human-rights provisions of the Charter as pious hopes which feed the eye but starve the spirit. To give reality to the Charter provisions, we must concentrate upon doing those things which are in the realm of practical statesmanship.

Our aim in this most delicate of fields must be the aim provided in the Charter itself. By chapter IX, all members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the

United Nations to promote, among other things, universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. Our actions must be responsive to that pledge. We must work with patience and with honesty toward achievement of the Charter goals.

Finally, I turn to a third group of problems before this session of the General Assembly, problems that have to do with the improvement of living conditions. In looking back over the record of the past 7 years, it is in this field of economic cooperation that we find the most hopeful and promising aspect of the work of the United Nations.

The beginnings that have been made in this work of economic and social cooperation through the United Nations are greatly encouraging to all who have participated in it. This is a new force in international relations. It expresses a growing sense of international responsibility for the needs and hopes of individual human beings. Behind this work lies a growing awareness that, in the twentieth century, international cooperation must mean not only treaties and conferences but people of many nations working alongside each other to grow more food, to wipe out illiteracy and disease, to increase production and trade.

The key to economic progress, to the expanding world economy for which we are all striving, is found in cooperative action to enable the world to increase its output of agricultural and industrial products. This is the heart of the matter. We are only beginning to appreciate the tremendous possibilities of the less-developed areas for this kind of expansion with the creation of basic economic facilities, particularly power and transport.

As the technical-assistance programs of the United Nations and its agencies continue to work their transformations in the economic and social fields, I am confident that we shall see an acceleration of private investment, both domestic and foreign. This is a process that may take many years of work, but in no other field of action, I believe, will we find that our efforts have so multiplied an effect as in the field of technical assistance.

There is no greater challenge to our ingenuity than that which is to be found in the stark contrast between present levels of production of food and industrial products and the knowledge available to us by which that production could be multiplied many times over.

The tragedy is that, in spite of tremendous progress in agricultural science, over half the world's people still suffer from malnutrition and many live on the verge of starvation. Despite progress in food production in many parts of the world, the fact is that world food output is increasing at a slower rate than is world population, and the world today has less food per person than it did before the war.



There are several active programs in this field that are deserving of more widespread attention and support. A good beginning has been made by the members of the Food and Agriculture Organization, who have pledged themselves to increase agricultural production in their countries over the next 5 years, so that there will be an increase of food production over population growth amounting to one or two percent each year.

At this session of the General Assembly we shall have an opportunity to review some of the promising work that has been done by member governments and the agencies of the United Nations in the vital field of land reform. This is, in my opinion, central to the whole problem of increasing food supply.

Two years ago, before this body, I expressed the conviction that common efforts to apply existing knowledge to the use and ownership of land could have a tremendous effect in relieving the misery and suffering of millions of people.<sup>3</sup> I spoke of the "vast opportunity (that) awaits us to bring, by such means as the United Nations has been developing, new hope to millions whose most urgent needs are for food, land, and human dignity." Since that time, much progress has been made in dealing with this problem and this opportunity. Programs of land reform have been launched in a number of countries in Asia and the Near East—programs which are already bringing new hope to the people of these lands. Universities and governments have cooperated in regional seminars for the exchange of information on land use and tenure. We shall, I believe, find great encouragement in hearing the reports of this progress.

This Assembly will also have an opportunity to consider the steps that have been taken to stimulate increased productivity in other fields. It is clear from the report submitted by the Secretary-General to the Economic and Social Council that methods are available by which marked increases in productivity could be achieved immediately. These methods would differ greatly from country to country according to local conditions, but the essential fact is that considerable increases can be achieved by the countries themselves through technical assistance and better utilization of existing tools and equipment.

Increases in productivity by such methods can result—and indeed, in many places they have resulted—in direct and immediate improvements in standards of living. And, as I have remarked before, the best guaranty of increased investment, both public and private, is such increases in productivity. It is imperative, of course, that such increased output be fairly distributed in the form of better incomes for workers and lower prices to consumers.

<sup>3</sup>For text of the Secretary's address, see BULLETIN of Oct. 2, 1950, p. 523.

These activities demonstrate the vitality and inventiveness with which many nations are working together to improve living standards, even now in the midst of world attention.

It is tragic that forces should exist in the world whose concept of their interests requires them to hinder and obstruct international action by all the rest of the world toward better conditions of life.

There are some schools of thought which doubt the capacity of free nations to meet the problems of a changing world without falling into economic catastrophe. To them I would say that such expectations are based upon an analysis which events have shown to be faulty—and, at best, out of date.

The free nations reject any notion that man is incapable of influencing events, that he is a helpless puppet in the face of determining forces, that crisis is inevitable.

### **The Free Nations' Record**

The record, I think, will bear me out when I say that the economies of the free nations have shown great capacity for growth and adaptation. It will show that despite the burdens we have inherited from World Wars I and II, despite the burdens we are now assuming to avert a third such catastrophe, the free nations have not been inhibited by doctrine or dogma from adaptability and ingenuity in meeting their economic problems. As a result, and despite the dire prophecies to the contrary, there has been a long-term rise in living standards among the industrially advanced nations. And this rise has been accompanied by an ever broader distribution of income. In the United States, for example, the real income in terms of purchasing power of the average American citizen has risen at least 40 percent since 1929. And this improvement, reflected in higher living standards, has been greatest among people in the middle and lower parts of the income scale.

The record will also show that the free nations have learned a great deal since the depression of the 1930's and that this learning has been applied in a whole series of measures which offer protection against a recurrence of that experience. We have built into our economies a series of stabilizers to protect our living standards and to encourage the productivity which makes them possible. Our social-security programs, price supports against severe declines in farm incomes, bank deposit insurance, modernized flexible banking and credit policies, as well as the tremendous accumulated demand for housing and public works—all of these are but a few of the stabilizers which would operate to counterbalance any substantial changes in economic conditions.

So much for the ability of the free economies to handle their domestic problems with skill and

flexibility. But what of their ability to work together in coping with forces that threaten economic stability? Here too, I think, the postwar record will show that the free nations are able to get together to create machinery to solve mutual economic problems. Consider the instruments that have been developed just in recent years to meet problems of international cooperation—such instruments as the International Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Regional Economic Commissions for Europe, Asia, and Latin America, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Schuman Plan, and many others.

These instruments, together with many other works, have been put together in the face of the tremendous burdens we have inherited from previous wars and also in the face of the burdens we now bear to prevent future wars.

We look forward with confidence to the opportunities for further growth and expansion which will open to us and to all free nations whenever the threat to our freedom and independence sub-

sides and we can safely release our great creative energies from the burden of armaments.

We all have a transcending common interest in this interdependent world in expanding freedom and increased well-being. We all have much to gain by cooperating together to advance this common interest in "better standards of life in larger freedom."

Our differing ways of life may impel us to pursue our objectives in various ways. But if we have confidence in our own particular ways we should be willing to submit them to the test of experience. We should be willing to be judged by the results of our works rather than by the prowess of our arms.

Let us then work to banish force and the threat of force as an instrument of national or ideological policy. Let us in this interdependent world share freedom with all men and all nations. Let us vie with one another, not in the arts of war but in the ways of peace, in the ways of building a world of expanding freedom and increased well-being for all mankind.

## Problems Facing the Seventh General Assembly

by John D. Hickerson

*Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

It is good to be back with you again at this annual reception to our delegates to the United Nations.

This year, perhaps by accident or perhaps by design, you are meeting midway between the opening of the seventh session of the General Assembly and the celebration of the seventh anniversary of the ratification of the Charter. This is a good occasion to talk about some of the problems facing the General Assembly and the part we Americans can play in helping to find solutions.

We all know that the United Nations has not transformed the world in the first 7 years of its history. That, we can freely admit without denying the validity of the ideals expressed at San Francisco or the value of the organization in these 7 years.

We have found that peace, real peace, has not

been as easy to achieve as all of us had hoped in 1945. But we are still guided and inspired by the goals of the Charter—to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations, and to achieve international co-operation. The obstacles to these goals have made us more determined than ever to make the United Nations work. This is not easy, but we believe that it can be done and must be done. It can be done if we marshal all our ingenuity, all our energy, all our powers of persuasion and leadership in getting all freedom-loving members of the United Nations to assume and carry out their responsibilities under the Charter. This is the task before us every day in the year. It is especially challenging as we face the problems of the seventh session of the General Assembly.

When people talk about the United Nations, they often do not distinguish between the Security Council, the General Assembly, or other organs of the United Nations. However, it is important to

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the American Association for the United Nations at New York on Oct. 19 (press release 818).

make these distinctions and to keep them clearly in mind, because of the fundamental differences in the responsibilities given them under the Charter. One of the main reasons the General Assembly has such a great variety of difficult problems on its agenda is this: The 55 Soviet vetoes in the Security Council have demonstrated that the Security Council can act effectively only when the U.S.S.R. wants it to. Inevitably, the other members of the United Nations have turned to the General Assembly as an action body. Admittedly, it is far from ideally suited to this role. But it is the best we have available. Since it was not expected to handle many of the problems now given to it, it has a special responsibility to consider them soberly and responsibly.

### **Continuing Crisis Atmosphere**

There has been talk about the highly charged atmosphere of this General Assembly session. We shouldn't let that bother us too much. We ought to be getting used to it. Just about every Assembly session opens against a background of tension and frustration. That's due to the state of the world, not the state of the General Assembly. This is the third session of the General Assembly while men are dying for the United Nations in Korea. Just as all of us have had to harden ourselves to live in a continuing crisis atmosphere, the General Assembly has had to accustom itself to meeting against a background of crisis. As realists, we don't expect the General Assembly to find adequate solutions to all the problems before it this year. We do expect to play our part in assisting the General Assembly to consider carefully the issues before it and, where possible, to contribute to their solution.

It seems to me that a simple test should be applied to each issue that confronts the General Assembly: What can the Assembly do to improve the prospects for settlement of that issue? The answer in each case must take into account many factors: What are the direct responsibilities of the parties concerned? Are they carrying out their obligations under the Charter? If not, what is the most effective way of getting them to do so?

Under the Charter, the General Assembly is given many types of responsibility and is equipped with a wide variety of powers. For example, it can be a forum to hear grievances. It can be a meeting place for important diplomatic conversations. It can make or review reports and studies. Or it can take specific action in vital matters of collective defense against aggression. There may be instances where doubt arises as to the legal authority of the General Assembly to take particular action. But usually the most important question in each instance is whether the proposed action would be wise and practical.

The application of wisdom and practical statesmanship to each of the issues before the Assembly will be difficult enough in the face of honest differences of opinion and strong national emotions.

The difficulty is intensified by the efforts of the Soviet bloc to exploit every disagreement, actual or potential, to its own advantage. We may look forward to efforts to inflame passions, to stir up trouble, to threaten, to deceive—to do anything in fact, which will tend to impede the settlement of problems in accordance with the Charter or which will further the Soviet foreign policy of splitting us from our allies and other friends.

We had a good sample of this yesterday when Mr. Vyshinsky disappointed those who had hoped against hope that he would modify, if only slightly, his typical vitriolic performance.<sup>2</sup> Instead he played again his same old worn-out phonograph record of lies and hate. Of course, this refusal to carry out the obligations of the Charter will complicate the solution of problems. Nevertheless, we believe that the other representatives in the United Nations now understand the nature and purpose of Soviet tactics and that they will join with us in frustrating them. We must therefore not become so discouraged by cynical Soviet tactics that we unwittingly further their objectives by ourselves abandoning hopes and efforts to deal with the issues before us.

The most important issue before the General Assembly is Korea. As Secretary Acheson said last Thursday, "The United Nations fight in Korea is the fight of every nation and every individual who values freedom."

We come to this Assembly with a record in Korea which every American can be proud of. In 28 months of fighting, the Communist aggressors have been thrown back beyond the starting point of their aggression. They have suffered terrible losses in men, matériel, and prestige. The plain fact is that they failed in their first overt aggression. Hitler did not fail until his last.

### **Proportionate Sharing of the Korean Burden**

Along with the gallant South Koreans, whose losses have exceeded ours, we have borne a disproportionate share of the military burden in Korea. We have had fighting with us 15 other forces of U.N. members. They have fought well—sensationally well. But there should be more troops there now, ready to continue the fighting as long as necessary. We intend to press hard in the General Assembly to get as many U.N. members as possible, who have not done so, to face up to their responsibilities in Korea. We have shown the aggressors that we will not flinch at the time of attack. We must also show them that they cannot wear us down. We have the moral and physical stamina to outlast them.

In Korea, we were entrusted by the United Nations with the conduct of the military operations, including the armistice negotiations. We have

<sup>2</sup> For excerpts from Andrei Vyshinsky's Oct. 18 statement in the General Assembly, see BULLETIN of Oct. 20, 1952, p. 634.



never lost sight of our goals—to achieve peace on terms consistent with the Charter and to avoid World War III. Yesterday we sent the Secretary-General a special report for the members of the United Nations on our stewardship.<sup>3</sup> I believe that it will show that the Unified Command has been worthy of the trust reposed in it.

I want to say a few words about the armistice negotiations. For almost 15 months we have been negotiating with the Communists on behalf of the United Nations. This has been an incredibly difficult task. In spite of every conceivable frustration and obstacle, our negotiators have dealt with the Communists with firmness, skill, and infinite patience. We have sincerely made every effort to achieve an honorable armistice. Only one issue remains unsettled: Should prisoners of war who resist repatriation be returned to the Communists at the point of a bayonet? On this matter of principle, we have said that we cannot and will not yield. We have made many alternative proposals to settle the question, but all of them have been categorically rejected by the Communists. They have not yet come forward with a single constructive proposal. By "constructive" we do not mean warmed-over versions, such as mentioned yesterday by Mr. Vyshinsky, of the same old Communist insistence on repatriation by force. It has been made clear that the responsibility for continuing the hostilities rests with the Communist aggressors. Yet we have not given up, nor will we give up, our hope or our efforts for peace. We have not broken off the negotiations. Our proposals remain open to the Communists. The duration of the present recess in the truce talks is up to them. As General Clark said on October 8, "We continue ready to conclude an armistice acceptable to the conscience of free peoples. It is up to the Communists to show whether they too want such an armistice."<sup>4</sup>

There will be nothing in our Korean proposals to the General Assembly suggesting that the truce negotiations be transferred to New York. That would solve nothing. Our program on Korea in the General Assembly will have one central objective—to demonstrate to the Communist aggressors in every possible way that on this issue—collective resistance to aggression—the free nations stand solidly together. The best chance for an armistice is for the United Nations to show that it is united and resolute.

In addition to mobilizing support for the U.N. action in Korea, the General Assembly must go forward with its long-range efforts to build a sound structure of collective security. There are many lessons to be learned from the Korean experience. The Assembly should frankly recognize that the record of performance in Korea is not good enough for a permanent system of collective resistance to

aggression. There must be no free rides. Every nation desiring the protection of such a system must be prepared to share proportionately in the sacrifices and the risks. Each must be willing to make the most precious contribution that can be made—manpower, human lives. We have amply demonstrated that we are willing to do our share—more than our share—but we are entitled to point out that while we may have the greatest per capita income in the world, our population per capita is the same as any other country. If the United Nations is to succeed, these patient efforts must continue from Assembly to Assembly.

#### **Disarmament Program Outlined**

There is another record we Americans can be proud of as the General Assembly meets—our efforts in the field of disarmament. We have not yet succeeded in these efforts and Mr. Vyshinsky made it clear again yesterday that there is no immediate prospect that we will. But, together with our British and French colleagues, we have set forth the broad outline of a possible and workable disarmament program. We have proposed great reductions in all armed forces, over 50 percent in the case of the United States and the U.S.S.R. We have suggested procedures to reduce armaments. We have given our ideas on the broad relationship between the principal elements in a disarmament program. We have shown that effective safeguards can be devised. We have shown that we do have a genuine and serious will to reduce armed forces and armaments to the point where aggression will be unlikely. I think our record on disarmament has strengthened our relations with other free nations in the United Nations because it is a demonstration of our will to peace. We shall review that record in the current General Assembly. We feel that despite Soviet obstruction, the efforts of the Disarmament Commission should continue. But, as the Secretary said in addressing the Assembly, "Until all states with substantial armaments are willing to cooperate in effective, guaranteed disarmament, the free law-abiding nations of the world must arm and remain armed in self-defense."

There is another type of problem confronting the General Assembly—that which grows out of the aspirations of peoples for a determining voice in their own affairs. Here is an area where the General Assembly must grope slowly and carefully with baffling and sensitive issues. Here is an area where the United States must play the cautious, thankless role of moderator. Our own history and our present responsibilities make it inevitable that this be our role.

We have listened to both sides and their friends on each of the disputed issues. We have learned to understand and appreciate the depth of feeling of each of the parties. There are honest differences of opinion as to what role the General Assembly should play in settling each of these issues. There

<sup>3</sup> See U.S./U.N. press release (No. 1554) dated Oct. 18, 1952.

<sup>4</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 20, 1952, p. 600.

is only one clear conclusion: No magic formula exists to solve these problems. Each issue must be handled from beginning to end with the utmost care so that the situation is improved and not worsened. Those of us who are not directly involved in these controversies, but have the confidence of all of the parties, have a special responsibility to assist the parties to come nearer to a solution. That's what we're trying to do.

In the nature of things, we should not expect to succeed fully. In spite of earnest efforts to promote sober and temperate discussion, there may well be some bitter words, some inflamed tempers—perhaps even some action we consider ill-advised. But these will not be the only tests of success in this field. The real test will be whether, by the end of the session, some progress has been made

in bringing the parties closer together and in advancing the goals of the Charter. Measured by this yardstick, rather than by the daily headlines, I am not pessimistic about the prospects for success.

Let me say a little more about these headlines. The United Nations is always competing for space with many dramatic world events, not the least of which at this time is our own election campaign. It is only natural that many stories about the General Assembly should feature "clashes," "crises," "splits," "bitterness," et cetera—in fact, that some should at times even reflect almost contemptuous impatience with the slowness of the whole process. Remember, though, when you see the headlines and the spicy stories, that we are dealing with problems which cannot be solved overnight and

### Summary of Proposals Made to the Disarmament Commission

The Disarmament Commission established by the sixth session of the General Assembly (U.N. doc. A/L.25, dated January 12, 1952; BULLETIN of March 31, 1952, p. 507) began work on March 14, at the U.N. Headquarters in New York. On that date the United States presented a proposed plan of work (U.N. doc. DC/3; BULLETIN of March 31, p. 503) suggesting five major subjects for consideration:

1. A verified census of all troops and arms, including atomic weapons;
2. Limitation of armaments, and elimination of atomic weapons and all instruments adaptable to mass destruction;
3. Negotiation of agreements on troops and arms permitted each state;
4. Enforcements and safeguards;
5. Procedure and timing of program.

On April 5 the United States presented as a basis for discussion a working paper proposing an armaments-and-armed-forces census to be carried out in five successive stages, beginning with a count of less secret armaments and progressing to the "detailed disclosure of stockpiles of novel [i.e., post-World War II] armaments including atomic" (U.N. doc. DC/Comm.2/1; BULLETIN of Apr. 14, 1952, p. 586).

For the purpose of seeking advance agreement on the objectives which should guide the Commission, the United States, on April 24, listed six principles which it considered essential to an effective disarmament program (U.N. doc. DC/C.1/1; BULLETIN of May 12, 1952, p. 752):

- (1) The goal of disarmament is not to regulate but to prevent war by relaxing tensions and fears created by armaments and by making war impossible.
- (2) To achieve this goal, all states must cooperate in reducing armed forces and armaments so that none will be able to prepare for war openly or secretly.
- (3) All states must join in international agreements restricting arms to types and quantities needed for internal security, and to carry out their obligations under the U.N. Charter.
- (4) These agreements must insure the progressive and balanced reduction of arms and armies, and the

elimination of all weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

(5) There must be effective safeguards provided for all phases of the disarmament program. Prohibition of atomic weapons must be accompanied by an effective system of international control of atomic energy to insure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes only.

(6) The agreements must provide for an effective system of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments, including atomic.

On May 28 the United States joined the United Kingdom and France in presenting the first of two proposals for setting up limitations on armed forces (U.N. doc. DC/10; BULLETIN of June 9, 1952, p. 910). The tripartite working paper suggested that the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and China might limit their military forces to a maximum of, say, between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 men each; the U.K. and France, to a maximum of, say, between 700,000 and 800,000; and all other countries with substantial armed strength to less than 1 percent of their populations except in unusual circumstances. A supplement to this proposal for numerical ceilings was presented to the Commission by the three powers on August 12 (U.N. doc. DC/12; BULLETIN of August 25, 1952, p. 292). The supplementary working paper calls for limiting armaments in types and quantities to those necessary to support permitted armed forces; suggests that the five permanent members of the Security Council hold a conference to negotiate tentative agreement among themselves as to the bases for establishing numerical ceilings and the distribution of permitted armed forces among national military services; and outlines the correlation between the major elements of a disarmament program.

On August 15, 1952, the United States gave its views favoring the elimination of bacterial weapons as part of a comprehensive disarmament program, emphasizing the necessity for safeguards in which the disclosure and verification proposals played an important role. These views were summarized on September 4 in a U.S. working paper presented to the Commission (U.N. doc. DC/15; for text see p. 671).

For an analysis of the tripartite disarmament program by Durward V. Sandifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for U.N. Affairs, see BULLETIN of September 29, 1952, p. 478.

which usually cannot be solved in terms of "victory." Remember, too, that the main achievements of the United Nations are rarely reflected in headlines or news stories. How often do you see a headline or story about Dr. Frank Graham's patient efforts to bring India and Pakistan closer to agreement on the Kashmir problem; about the World Health Organization's campaign against malaria; about improving living standards through technical assistance; about making international air travel safer; about developing and exchanging statistics on trade, commerce, production—so important to the emerging countries of the Middle and Far East; about the thousands of other daily activities of the United Nations and its specialized agencies? These are true measures of success. I hope that you who know about them will see that they become better and more widely known.

Finally, may I share with you a few thoughts about our role of responsible leadership in the United Nations? How can we exercise that leadership most wisely and effectively? First of all, the positions we take must be sound and morally right. They must, of course, be truly representative of the American public. I believe that we come as close as possible to meeting this requirement by reason of the bipartisan nature of our delegation and our constant consultation with American leaders and groups.

The second test of our leadership is whether we

can count on the firm support of our allies. This means that we must have a true partnership with them. We must consult them. We must take into account their viewpoint and their problems. Incidentally, sometimes our allies get blamed for things which never happened or aren't their fault. For instance, a few days ago a story made the rounds that Secretary Acheson had "watered down" his opening address because of pressure from certain friendly delegations. There was no basis for the story at all. Not only had no drafts been discussed with them, but there had been no "watering down" in successive drafts.

Third, in order to obtain the support of the other non-Soviet members of the United Nations we must be able to persuade them of the essential correctness of our position. To do this effectively, we must understand their doubts and answer them patiently and convincingly in terms of their own self interest. We must welcome their constructive suggestions. We must seek to lead and not to dominate. This means that we cannot always act as quickly or as decisively as we would sometimes like. But the end result will be worth the trouble.

These are the elements of responsible leadership which your delegation will bear in mind as it approaches the issues of the seventh General Assembly. With your support and understanding, we shall do our utmost to help the Assembly make a real contribution to peace.

## **U.S.S.R. Charged with Misrepresenting Facts in Bomber Incident**

*On October 12 Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin of the Soviet Union handed to the U.S. Chargé at Moscow, Elim O'Shaughnessy, a note charging that on October 7 a U.S. B-29 bomber violated Soviet frontiers in the area of Yuri Island. The note further charged that the aircraft opened fire on two Soviet fighter planes, which returned the fire, and that the American aircraft then disappeared in the direction of the sea. On October 17 the American Embassy at Moscow delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs the U.S. reply of protest against this unprovoked Soviet attack on an American plane.*

*Printed below are texts of the Soviet note of October 12 and the U.S. reply of October 17.*

### **SOVIET NOTE OF OCTOBER 12**

Telegraphic text

The Government of the U.S.S.R. considers it necessary to state the following to the Government of the U.S.A.

According to a verified report from competent Soviet agencies on October 7, 1952, at about 15 hours 30 minutes, Vladivostok time, a four-motored B-29 bomber with U.S.A. identification signs violated the state frontier of the U.S.S.R. in the area of the Yuri Island. Two Soviet fighters which had taken off demanded that the American bomber follow them for landing at the nearest air drome. Instead of fulfilling the legitimate demand of Soviet fighters, the violating airplane



opened fire on them. After returning the fire of the Soviet fighters, the American bomber went off in the direction of the sea.

The Soviet Government expresses decisive protest against this new case of violation of the state frontier of the U.S.S.R. by American military airplane and insists that the U.S. Government take measures for prohibition of violations of the state frontiers of the U.S.S.R. by American airplanes.

#### U.S. REPLY OF OCTOBER 17

Press release 816 dated October 17

The Embassy of the United States of America acknowledges the receipt of the Ministry's note of October 12, 1952, and upon instructions from its Government, states the following:

In its note, the Ministry asserts that on October 7, 1952, at approximately 15 hours 30 minutes, Vladivostok time, a U.S. B-29 bomber aircraft violated the state frontier of the Soviet Union in the area of Yuri Island, that this aircraft opened fire on two Soviet fighter planes, and that the Soviet fighter planes then returned fire after which the U.S. aircraft went off in the direction of the sea.

The American aircraft referred to in the Ministry's note was a U.S. Air Force plane with a crew of eight officers and men on a routine flight over Japan from which it did not return. The plane was not equipped for combat operations of any kind. It carried no bombs and its guns were inoperative. Its officers were under explicit instructions to remain within Japanese territory at all times.

A thorough investigation by U.S. authorities has established that the U.S. Air Force plane did not, as alleged, violate any Soviet state frontier and that it did not at any time fly over Yuri Island. In fact, the radar plot of the tracks of the U.S. and Soviet aircraft shows conclusively that the interception by the Soviet fighter aircraft occurred 32 miles from Yuri Island and approximately 6 miles from the Island of Hokkaido.

Moreover, the question of a violation of the Soviet state frontier could not arise in any case since the island of Yuri is not Soviet territory, but as an island of the Habomai Group is Japanese territory under Japanese sovereignty.

By its calculated misrepresentation of the facts of this incident the Soviet Government has sought, not for the first time, to evade responsibility for a wanton and unjustifiable attack carried out on an undefended plane by fighter planes of its air force. This responsibility must be borne by the Soviet Government, however, and the U.S. Government would urge the Soviet Government seriously to consider the grave consequences which can flow from its reckless practice, if persisted in, of attacking without provocation the aircraft of other states.

Accordingly, the Embassy has been instructed to reject the Ministry's note of October 12 as being without foundation in fact, to protest in the strongest terms against the unprovoked shooting down of the U.S. plane, and to request the payment of appropriate compensation for the loss of this aircraft and the lives of any of its crew who may have perished.

The Soviet Government is further requested to furnish an immediate report on the results of the search operation which, on the basis of an eyewitness account reported in the investigation conducted by the U.S. Government, is believed to have been carried out by a Soviet patrol boat operating from Suisho-To Island, and to provide full information on the whereabouts and welfare of any crew members who may have survived with a view to their prompt repatriation to the United States.

#### Toward European and Atlantic Unity

by Ambassador William H. Draper, Jr.  
*U. S. Special Representative in Europe*<sup>1</sup>

Powerful forces are driving the countries of the Western World to change the political patterns of centuries and to move toward new forms of association. Aggressive dictatorship in this twentieth century leaves free peoples of the West only this choice: Unity in freedom or unity in slavery. We are choosing unity in freedom.

Within the past few months events have been taking place in Europe which will stand out sharply in the perspective of history. Six nations in the heart of continental Europe have taken important steps toward the merger of their sovereignties in a single community. On a broader front we have just witnessed a great surge of activity by the 16 nations in the Council of Europe. In Paris, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation continues its vital work directed toward creating a single market in Europe that is both wide and deep.

The European Coal and Steel Community—the so-called Schuman Plan—merging the basic resources of six countries, has come into being.

Other important European projects are in the wind. A new spirit is growing in Europe today—a European spirit—and with it the hope that adequate security, economic well-being, and a life of dignity, so uncertain on a national scale, can be found in a wider context.

The pressures and incentives that favor European unification are plain. Clearly, the free coun-

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the New York *Herald Tribune* Forum at New York City, Oct. 20 (press release 811 dated Oct. 16).

tries of Europe are in danger, if separate, of falling one by one under Soviet domination.

But the Soviet threat is not the only force driving Western Europe toward unification. Let us not forget, for Europe certainly does not, that nationalist aggression originating in Germany caused two world wars that brought the civilized world to the brink of destruction. During the long agony of World War II there was born a grim determination among people in many countries of Europe, including Germany, that nationalist aggression must never happen again. This determination sustains the statesmen of continental Western Europe as they fashion an integrated European army to prevent aggression by one country against the other, while building the defensive strength of all against outside aggression from the East.

Economic and political necessities likewise drive Europe toward unity. Insufficient production and narrow markets; national barriers to commerce, transport, and movement of labor; low productivity—these have hindered its economic progress and its resistance to Communist subversion. It has become increasingly evident to the people of Western Europe that they can survive in freedom and economic decency only with wider groupings of political and economic power, capable not only of solving more of Europe's basic problems without outside aid but also of playing a more influential role in world affairs.

#### European Unification: An Attainable Goal

Today, European unification is no longer a remote ideal but an attainable objective.

It is an attainable objective *provided*—and to my mind this proviso is crucial—*provided* the movement toward unity in Europe continues to take place as a part of the growing unity of the Atlantic community.

If you chart the growth of European institutions in the last few years you have also to chart the growth of the Atlantic community. And you have to trace initiative, action, and interaction back and forth endlessly across the Atlantic. For European unity has grown only within the framework of a developing Atlantic community. And European and Atlantic institutions are intertwined and interdependent.

It was General Marshall's initiative in 1947, in response to Europe's manifest need, that called into being the Committee for European Economic Cooperation. In turn, it was the Brussels Pact of 1948 that was the progenitor of the North Atlantic Pact of 1949 and that led directly to the creation of the Council of Europe. It was in the Council of Europe that a European defense force was first proposed and debated; but it was a decision of the North Atlantic Council regarding a German defense contribution that called forth the proposal for a European army from Mr. Pleven,

then Prime Minister of France. The treaty for a European defense community was brought to signature primarily by great European statesmanship, but with the strong encouragement of the United States as essential to the security and well-being of the Atlantic community.

It is not by chance that the growth of unity in Western Europe in the past 5 years has been paralleled by the growth of the Atlantic community. It is not mere coincidence that continental Europe has created organs of unity step by step with the commitment of U.S., British, and Canadian resources and power to the defense and economic well-being of Europe as part of the Atlantic community.

These parallel developments—toward European unity and toward Atlantic unity—are impelled by the same hopes, fears, and pressures.

Soviet imperialism threatens Western Europe, but it threatens no less the United States. And it is clear beyond question that Europe alone, no matter how organized, cannot within the foreseeable future successfully defend itself against Soviet attack. Nor can the United States afford to be without allies. Both Europe and we ourselves need a greater coalition of strength—the Atlantic coalition.

The revival of German or other aggression in Western Europe itself is a danger that the countries there must guard against as must we in the United States. This, at least, we have learned from two world wars in our time. This threat can be partially guarded against by a continental Europe so organized—with national military power and resources so merged—as to make nationalist aggression difficult. But the full guaranty lies in Atlantic community organization, with European defense forces merged into a NATO army.

Likewise, continental Europe's basic economic and social problems can be partially solved by purely European action to create a single market and to rationalize and expand production over a wider area. But their solution is also dependent upon the tariff rates, foreign-investment practices, and raw-materials policies of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada—and upon the level of economic activity in the United States.

It is highly significant, I think, that progress toward greater economic cooperation and integration in Europe in the past 5 years has been made within the context of large-scale U.S. economic aid which has relieved external balance-of-payments difficulties. Long-range progress is likely in the future only if Europe finds means of earning its way in the world and of assuring a decent standard of living to its people without large-scale outside aid.

We have made great strides the past 2 years in strengthening our military defenses. But General Ridgway, the Supreme Commander, has

given clear warning that we have not done enough—that we must build greater and greater strength in the face of today's danger. He is right. We must hold to our course. Mutual security must come first.

But we in the United States have not, as yet, faced frontally and frankly the fact that sound businesslike economic foundations for the Atlantic community must also be built and maintained. Instead we have kept standing a veritable Chinese Wall of customs barriers and procedures. With too little trade we have been shoring up the community with grants of aid. Neither do I think the other members of the Atlantic community have faced up to their side of the same problem. In my opinion, Europe must *produce much more*, and we must *buy much more* from Europe. Unless we import more, the existing dollar gap threatens our own export trade and may unfavorably affect our mutual defense effort. We must consider together the longer range economic and social problems of the Atlantic community—as a community—and move toward sound solutions and closer association.

If the North Atlantic Treaty nations are to build and maintain common defenses over a long period—military defenses, economic defenses, political defenses—it will be necessary to reach clear understandings, to hammer out common policies, and to reach rapid agreement on the tactics of mobile defense. We are 14 sovereign nations with a common purpose and a common objective. Differences in points of view—and they will of course continue to arise—must and can be resolved in a spirit of mutual good will and of full equality.

#### **Soviet Blueprint for Power and Conquest**

Institutional unity in the North Atlantic area is growing today, as we have seen, in several concentric circles. There is the developing federal structure of the six continental nations; there is the wider association of Western Europe as a whole, of which the Community of Six is an inescapable part; and there is the still wider Atlantic community. All are interdependent; each requires for its most effective operation the successful operation of the other. Each, at its level, is capable of solving certain problems. Each is incapable of dealing with problems all across the board. The great challenge to statesmanship in the period ahead is to make certain that the growing unities of the West develop in harmonious relation among themselves and also with the free world as a whole.

It is just such unity and harmony in the West that the Kremlin most fears. For more than 2 weeks we have witnessed the public spectacle of Stalin, Malenkov, and others of the Soviet oligarchy sharpening their ideological weapons for a renewed assault upon freedom and pointing out just where, for fullest effect, the main blows are to be delivered.

And where are those most vital spots? Precisely those points at which free peoples are drawing together and presenting a united front. The tremendous power of the Soviet Empire—its propaganda, its diplomacy, its economy, its world-wide subversive apparatus—is to be concentrated upon disrupting the growing solidarity of the free world, to prevent the unification of Europe, and to break up the Atlantic alliance. Stalin predicts our economic collapse. Moreover, he even openly predicts that he will not need to attack us because we will attack and destroy each other.

It was not very long ago that Hitler described in *Mein Kampf* the means by which he expected to rise to power in Germany and how he proposed to use that power to dominate the Eurasian Continent. Many people who should have known better persisted, right up to the end, in disbelieving and ignoring his blueprint for power and conquest.

Today, Stalin's plan of action for the period ahead is in print—right before our eyes. We, the free world, can checkmate that plan. Let us, this time, use our knowledge wisely and well. Let us unite now in political, economic, and military defense.

#### **First Report to Congress on Battle Act of 1951**

W. Averell Harriman, Director for Mutual Security, in his capacity as Administrator of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, on October 15 released his first semiannual report to the Congress on security controls over exports to the Soviet bloc, commonly known as the Battle Act.

A companion law to the Mutual Security Act of 1951, the Battle Act was enacted by the Congress to support, extend, and strengthen the controls exercised by the free nations over the export of strategic materials to the Soviet bloc.

In presenting the report, Mr. Harriman stated that "substantial progress had been made in controlling strategic trade in such a way as to reinforce our total security."

The report certifies that for several years, the important free world nations "have refused without any exception, the shipment to the Soviet bloc of arms, ammunition, implements of war, or atomic energy materials."

These nations also deny the Soviet bloc a large range of other strategic products and control shipments, in quantity, of still other export materials.

Export licensing systems have been strengthened and illegal trade cut down, the report points out.

In addition, stricter measures have been invoked by the free nations against Communist China after the United Nations recommended in



May 1951 a strategic embargo on exports to that aggressor nation.

In his letter of transmittal to the Congress, Mr. Harriman, while emphasizing the necessity for preventing highly strategic goods from falling into Soviet hands, pointed out that at the present time "cutting off trade entirely would harm our common defense effort more than it harms the potential aggressor."

"Other free nations," he said, "obtain commodities from the Soviet bloc that are extremely valuable to their own defense efforts and the economic stability on which their defense is based."

The most effective control system at this time, he asserted, is a *selective* one, which stops highly strategic exports to the Soviet bloc at the same time as it allows the flow of other exports in return for commodities which the free world needs.

The report traces the history of joint controls since 1948, when Soviet actions made necessary a series of defensive measures in both the military and economic field in order to insure the survival of the West.

It tells the story of an informal committee set up by the free nations to deal with the security aspects of their trade with the East and to determine the areas for which common controls were necessary.

The report warns that Kremlin policy is directed toward making trade controls an issue which will "stir up resentment and disagreement for the purpose of splitting the United States from its allies and destroying our mutual defense system." Under the Battle Act program, which became operative early this year, the Administrator, after consultation with technical and other experts in many U.S. agencies, listed for complete embargo a comprehensive group of military and industrial products. Most of these items were already embargoed by other friendly nations.

The Battle Act provides that in the event a nation receiving aid from the United States "knowingly permits" shipment of embargo materials, such aid shall be terminated unless the President determines that cessation of aid would be

"clearly detrimental to the security of the United States." In a few cases, embargoed items have been shipped in fulfillment of contracts concluded before the enactment of the Battle Act. The Administrator's report sets forth Presidential determinations in these cases.

The report also reviews the levels of control established over "lesser" strategic items, whose importance is primarily related to quantities shipped. It points out the manner in which goods are added to or deleted from control lists in the light of technical and other information which becomes available. This procedure is roughly similar to the continually changing "priority lists" set up by this Government for a different purpose—to make available rather than deny vital materials to our defense industries.

The latter part of the report deals with the particular problems posed in Western Europe and other free-world areas in terms of the imports they continue to require from the Communist countries. Measures taken to provide alternate markets and sources of supply and to increase domestic production, the document states, are directly related to the success of security controls. Special attention is paid to the problem of the dollar gap which, if unsolved, increases the economic pressure on European and Asiatic free nations to trade with the Soviet bloc in order to acquire commodities for which they are unable to pay in dollars.

The report explains that, since the Soviet bloc is relatively self-sufficient in most basic raw materials and already possesses basic armament industries, no amount of controls can stop Soviet war production. It is possible, however, to slow down that war production, and the report states that there is evidence that security controls are succeeding in this objective.

Reemphasizing the dual Battle Act objectives of building free-world strength and impeding Soviet war potential, the report concludes that these can continue to succeed "if the free nations preserve their unity of purpose in the face of Soviet attempts to divide us."

## Japanese Education In Review

by Jane M. Alden

The history of modern Japanese education dates from the Meiji Restoration in 1868. The transfer of political power from the Shogun to the Emperor was preceded by the reopening of Japan to Western influence. The aim of the leaders of the Restoration was to develop, as rapidly as possible, a strong, homogeneous state, modern in the Western sense, capable of resisting the encroachments of the Western Powers. Education was immediately recognized as a primary means to achieve these goals.

The formative years for the educational system coincided with the period when Japan was formulating a system of modern government and society. At the outset there was a marked tendency toward indiscriminate acceptance of everything Western which eventually precipitated a conflict between Western materialism and traditional Japanese values. The system of government which finally emerged in the Constitution of 1889 was authoritarian, centralized, and modern. The development of the Japanese educational system, proceeding as it did concurrently with the development of a modern governmental system, was subject to the same influences, conflicts, and pressures. It was inevitable that the educational system that finally emerged would bear a direct relationship to the system and theory of government which the Japanese adopted.

### Early Development of the Educational System

The Ministry of Education was established in 1871, and the following year it inaugurated a modern, centralized educational system. During the initial period of development, from 1872 to 1886, the philosophy of utilitarianism dominated Japanese education at the expense of classical learning and traditional Japanese moral and cultural values. The influence of American, British, and French educational policies and practices was considerable during this period. Those Japanese educational leaders who were most influenced by these contacts opposed centralization and stand-

ardization and sought to establish, especially in the private schools, a tradition of independent thought. The growing emphasis on Western materialism and the perceptible, but far lesser, inroads made by Western educational philosophy only served to sharpen the conflict within Japanese society and to increase the fears of the dominant leadership group.

By 1886 a strong reaction to the "over Westernization" of the educational system set in. An Imperial Ordinance in that year defined the function of the Imperial University as providing education to meet the needs of the state. Instruction in morals, national language, and classics was reinstated and increasingly emphasized at all levels in the school system. In 1890 the Imperial Rescript on Education was issued, which defined for the succeeding 60 years the role of Japanese education: to prepare Japanese youth for service to the state. The Rescript set forth the broad ethical principles which would henceforth govern pupils and teachers and paved the way for nationalist indoctrination through the educational system. During this period the ascendancy of Prussian influence on Japanese education as well as government was apparent. As contrasted with other Western influences, it proved to be more compatible with traditional Japanese values.

The development and expansion of the educational system was rapid during the period from 1890 through the early 1920's. By the late 1920's the tempo of expansion had slowed and attention was concentrated on the inculcation of the national spirit through the educational system. This renewed emphasis on education as the means of advancing national policies was a direct outgrowth of the rise to power of the military and ultranationalist groups at home and a renewal of aggressive conquests abroad. This situation called for complete national acceptance and support for national policies. The educational system was again a primary means to achieve the goals of the dominant political leadership.

## Education Before World War II

A brief discussion of the educational system as it existed just prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War will serve as a basis for evaluating the changes in its organization and philosophy which were brought about by the occupation during the postwar period.

The progress from elementary schools to a university degree required 17 years. Progression from one level to the next was determined by ability to pass the entrance examinations and financial ability to meet the tuition fees. Only about one-half of one percent of the students who entered elementary schools ultimately managed to obtain a bachelor's degree. This educational system was characterized by the acquiring of factual knowledge (necessary to pass entrance examinations), increasing competition because of the prestige of a few schools as a student fought his way up the educational pyramid, a minimum of student expression, and a maximum of standardization of subject matter. Throughout his passage through the educational system the student was imbued with a sense of loyalty and duty to the state, of obedience to higher authority, and conformity to the accepted social pattern. Only in the private schools could the student escape the full impact of these forces, but in the years immediately preceding the war this relative freedom enjoyed by private educational institutions was all but extinguished.

In 1940 there were 52,474 schools throughout Japan with 494,538 teachers and 17.4 million students. Compulsory education extended for the first 6 years of the elementary school, and although this period was extended to 8 years in 1941, the war prevented the carrying out of this regulation.

Elementary schools provided 6 years of compulsory education. There were nearly 26,000 elementary schools in 1940, almost all of which were public. Nearly three-fourths of all students were enrolled in these schools. The curriculum included the Japanese language, arithmetic, science, physical education, geography, and history. Boys received training in military arts and girls in sewing. Textbooks were either compiled by the Ministry or approved by it. Standardization of teaching methods and subject matter and learning by rote characterized elementary schooling.

Students proceeded from the elementary schools either to attend higher elementary schools for 2 or 3 years, after which their education terminated, or to enter secondary schools. A relatively small number of students received no schooling beyond the compulsory 6 years in the elementary grades.

Entrance into secondary or middle schools was by written entrance examinations until 1939, when oral examinations were substituted in many cases. Tuition fees were charged. Approximately 25 percent of the elementary-school graduates entered secondary schools each year. The course

was for 5 years. Boys and girls attended separate schools with different curriculums, and the standards in girls' schools tended to be lower than those in boys' schools.

Teachers in secondary schools had little freedom to experiment in teaching methods or to vary subject content. Pupil discussion was not encouraged and conformity rather than individuality was emphasized. Organized military training by military officers was given in boys' schools.

In the boys' schools the entire curriculum was designed primarily to prepare the student for the entrance examinations for the higher schools; in the girls' schools the curriculum was directed toward preparing them for their place in society since, for most of the students, formal education ended at this level.

The Ministry of Education controlled directly or indirectly this vast educational system. There were three types of schools: (1) government or national schools, which were established and directly controlled by the Ministry; (2) public schools established by prefectural and municipal governments, and only indirectly controlled by the Ministry through the prefectural government; and (3) private schools established by individuals and organizations which were licensed by the Ministry but had some degree of freedom within the general framework of regulations. The national government bore the full costs of the national schools, while the public schools were supported by the national, prefectural, and municipal governments, the latter providing buildings and maintenance. Small tuition fees were also paid by the students, even in the compulsory elementary grades, and private gifts, often raised by associations formed to support the schools, contributed to school revenue.

Following graduation from secondary schools, students entered either colleges or normal schools where their education was completed, or entered the higher schools for a 3-year university preparatory course. Entrance into all three types of schools was by written examination.

The universities offered a 3-year course leading to a bachelor's degree. Postgraduate work from 2 to 5 years was also offered. In 1940 there were 47 universities in Japan, 22 of which were located in Tokyo. Greatest prestige was attached to graduation from one of the nine imperial universities, especially from Tokyo Imperial. Instruction in the universities was by lectures and from texts chosen by the professor. Emphasis was on careful memorization of both lectures and texts, and class discussion was not encouraged. The freedom of the professor to express views that differed radically from the prevailing policies of the government or the basic tenets of Japanese society became increasingly dangerous as the government intensified its purge of so-called liberal professors in the 1930's. Extracurricular student activities were



carefully organized and supervised by the Ministry of Education and the school administration.

Although the disadvantages from a Western point of view of this educational system are most often emphasized, the accomplishments should not be overlooked. In the short space of 60 years the Japanese developed a system which provided mass education, to which the high literacy rate bears witness, and this system provided a body of technically competent professional people capable of assuming the leadership of a modern industrial society. The Japanese have long had a high regard for education, and continuous efforts were made to improve the caliber of education provided. The fact that this educational system tended to reinforce the authoritarian character of the state and Japanese society, that it discouraged independence of thought and individual initiative, was primarily because this was the purpose it was designed to serve.

### **Educational Reforms Under the Occupation**

The magnitude of the task which the Occupation undertook in the field of education is evident when the basic philosophy laid down in the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 is compared with the philosophy which the Occupation sought to introduce. This new philosophy of education is perhaps best stated in the directive of the Far Eastern Commission to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), dated March 27, 1947,<sup>1</sup> which reads in part:

Education should be looked upon as the pursuit of truth, as a preparation for life in a democratic nation, and as a training for the social and political responsibilities which freedom entails. Emphasis should be placed on the dignity and worth of the individual, on independent thought and initiative, and on developing a spirit of inquiry.

The Occupation policies in respect to education can be divided into two general categories: (1) on the negative side, to eliminate from the schools militaristic and ultranationalist ideology and its exponents, and (2) on the positive side, to establish an educational system and ideology which would further the development of a representative government and a society based on the freedom and dignity of the individual. The negative task was undertaken immediately after the surrender despite the dislocation of the school system at the end of the war and the urgency of reopening the schools to maintain law and order.

In October 1945 the Japanese Government was directed by SCAP to eliminate from the educational system those teachers and school officials who were known to be "militaristic, ultranationalistic or antagonistic to the objectives and policies of the Occupation." These individuals were removed and/or barred from occupying any position in the educational system. Further, no one who

served in the military was eligible to serve in the school system. The Japanese Government set up an elaborate screening process to eliminate such persons, in accordance with standards drawn up by SCAP and subject to SCAP review. The entire purge program was under continuing review by SCAP officials.

Other negative actions followed in quick succession. The Japanese Government was directed to eliminate the dissemination of Shinto doctrines by the educational institutions supported in whole or in part by public funds. Military education was eliminated from the schools. Courses in morals, Japanese history, and geography were suspended until their content could be reviewed and revised and new textbooks prepared. All textbooks and teachers' manuals relating to these subjects were withdrawn from the schools.

On the positive side, the new Constitution which came into force in May 1947 and the Fundamental Law of Education of 1947 provide the framework for the new educational system. The Constitution specifically guarantees academic freedom and accords to all people "the right to receive an equal education correspondent to their ability." Compulsory education is free, and all persons having children under their protection are obligated to see that they receive such education. The Fundamental Law of Education outlines the basic aims of the new educational system such as academic freedom, equal opportunity in education, 9 years of free, compulsory education. Furthermore, coeducation is recognized, religious teaching in the public schools is prohibited, and political education or activity for or against any specific political party is prohibited.

### **The New School System**

The school system was completely revised by the School Education Law of 1947 which established the 6-3-3-4 system, i. e. 6 years of elementary school, 3 years of junior high school, 3 years of senior high school, and a 4-year university course. Compulsory education was extended to 9 years, to become fully effective in 1949. At least one government university was established in each prefecture in order to provide greater educational opportunities.

Within this new educational system far greater freedom is permitted both teachers and pupils. Textbooks are no longer compiled by the Ministry of Education; teachers and local school authorities are permitted to select books from a list of authorized texts. Coeducation has been accepted, although not uniformly throughout the country. Generally, however, boys and girls receive equal education, and the opportunities for women to advance through the educational system have been greatly increased. In the classroom the former emphasis on teaching by rote has been replaced by methods designed to encourage individual expression and initiative.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1947, p. 746.

The decentralization of control over the educational system is one of the most important changes introduced by the Occupation. In place of the highly centralized prewar system, control over education is legally divided between (1) the Ministry; (2) the prefectural boards of education, governors, and assemblies; and (3) the local boards of education, mayors, and local assemblies. The role of each is defined by law. The Ministry's primary functions are to provide professional and technical guidance and advice, to prepare draft legislation on minimum educational standards for submission to the national Diet, and to compile and administer the national education budget.

On the prefectural and local levels popularly elected boards of education<sup>2</sup> were created to administer education in all local public schools. Universities were excluded from the jurisdiction of these boards.

The prefectural boards of education are responsible for certifying teachers, appointing superintendents of education, approving textbooks and curriculums, and advising local boards of education. There is some overlapping of functions between the prefectural and local boards. Local boards of education are required to establish adequate schools to provide 9 years of compulsory education. Schools are controlled and operated by the local boards, which determine curriculum, select textbooks from the lists approved by the prefectural boards, appoint and dismiss teachers and principals, and perform other functions that relate to operation and management of the local school system. The boards of education do not control the school budget. They draw up the budgets for presentation to the local and prefectural assemblies, but the latter are free to act as they see fit on the draft budget. The Diet determines the size of the national contribution to local education.

On the university level, the Ministry of Education has primary jurisdiction over all universities, whether public or private, although this power is greatly circumscribed compared to the prewar period. Each university is semiautonomous, and the administration and faculty have considerable control over internal university affairs. The Ministry retains the authority to set the standards that must be met for the creation of universities. In the postwar period the number of universities has risen from 47 in 1940 to 221 in 1951.

In 1951 there were 20,000,000 students, 708,000 teachers, and 45,000 schools of all levels throughout Japan. This represents an increase in the number of students and teachers but a decrease of about 7,500 in the number of schools. War damage is the primary reason for this decrease.

<sup>2</sup> Six of the seven members of the prefectural boards and four of the five members of the local boards are elected; one member on each board is selected by and from the prefectural and local assemblies, respectively.

### Outlook for the Post-Treaty Period

The future development of the Japanese educational system has been profoundly affected by the impact of Occupation-sponsored reforms upon a well developed, centralized, educational system. When the Japanese peace treaty became effective on April 28, 1952, the Japanese were free for the first time to review and modify their new educational system. There can be little doubt that the Japanese will undertake some modifications. The key question is the extent and nature of these modifications and whether they will be confined to the organization of the school system or whether they will affect the basic philosophy which was the goal of the reforms.

In assessing the importance of future modifications in Japanese education, it is well to keep in mind that the Occupation utilized American concepts, practices, and philosophy as the basis for remodeling the Japanese educational system. Prior to the Occupation, Japanese education differed from its American counterpart not only in its organization and structure but more importantly in its aims and philosophy. Although these two aspects are closely related, it is possible to maintain the basic philosophic concepts of American education without adhering to the American system of organization in its entirety.

The present and future status of the educational system is a matter of great concern to Japanese leadership and there is considerable divergence of views on its future role and development. At the present time attention is centered on modifications and adjustments in the organization of the educational system, leaving the larger question of educational philosophy for future consideration.

It is quite possible that the 6-3-3-4 system will be modified. The economic situation has limited, and will continue to limit, the funds that can be devoted to erecting new school buildings and renovating damaged ones, and a shortage of trained teachers will continue to hamper the creation of new schools. Moreover there is some inclination on the part of some Japanese educators to favor a return to the more familiar pattern of school organization, although not necessarily to the older system of centralized control and standardization. A reduction in the compulsory school period, at least temporarily, may be another result of the stringent financial situation and of the shortage of school buildings and teachers.

### Problems of the Decentralized System

Of far greater significance to the fundamental concept of democratic education is the future of the decentralization of control over the school system. The operation of the boards of education has proved to be the weakest link in the present decentralized system. There is pressure for the elimination of popular election and the substitution of appointment as the means for selecting board



members. This pressure has been particularly evident, since the establishment of municipal, town, and village boards of education by popular election is scheduled for this fall. This election will bring the number of boards of education in Japan up to about 10,500. Moreover teachers are eligible to be members of the boards and they, or their representatives, have been elected in significant numbers. There is a tendency for the teachers to be the more active members of the boards and as a result there is opposition to this teacher domination of the school system. Another major problem of the board-of-education system is the board's lack of control over school budgets.

These problems are capable of solution short of eliminating the boards themselves. Teachers can be made ineligible for board membership, or their representation limited in proportion to the non-teacher elements on the boards. Present school districts can be consolidated, thus decreasing the number of boards of education.

Although it is probably not desirable, for reasons quite apart from education, to circumscribe the financial power of the local and prefectural assemblies, it is possible to limit their consideration of the education budget to the size of the budget and to major policy decisions concerning expenditure of the allocated funds. This would curtail the current practice of detailed review and recommendation by the assemblies. Such a step would at least increase the ability of the boards to determine educational policy and development through budget administration. Whether the Japanese will adopt this course or will abolish the boards is not evident at present. Abolition of the boards will not necessarily destroy the system of decentralized control over education since, assuming a continuation of local autonomy, control could remain at the prefectural and local levels with the popularly elected executives and assemblies. Such a solution would not be without its disadvantages, notably in terms of involving local politics more closely in educational affairs.

The extent to which the new basic aims of the educational system will remain unchanged is far more difficult to assess. No one would contend that the old attitudes and concepts have been eradicated either in relation to education specifically or in the broader field of social organization and government. The future of these educational reforms is to a considerable extent dependent upon the survival of the social and legal reforms just as in the earlier period the development of Japanese education and the form of government and the organization of society finally adopted were inter-related. While progress was made during the Occupation in creating a vested interest among broad segments of the body politic in the survival of a free educational system, it is equally true that older ideas and their exponents still have a considerable influence. This situation will undoubtedly give rise to a modification in the philosophy of educa-

tion, but beyond this it is still too early in the post-Occupation period to speculate on the final role of education.

• *Mrs. Alden, author of the above article, is a special assistant in the Office of Field Programs of The International Information Administration.*

## **U.S., Japan Consider Alaskan Forest Products Market**

Press release 800 dated October 10

A mission representing the Japanese Government and Japanese pulp and timber industries is now in Washington exploring with U.S. authorities the possibility of obtaining forest products from Alaska.

The mission, headed by Junichiro Kobayashi, Director General, Council of Japanese Forest Resources, outlined to American authorities Japan's long-term requirements for forest products and the reasons for Japanese interest in the establishment of an American corporation to secure supplies from Alaska. Mr. Kobayashi pointed out that at the present rate of cutting, Japan's softwood resources will be virtually eliminated within approximately 15 years. He stated that Japan cannot reduce its present rate of cutting because of its heavy requirements, which include supplies to the U.N. forces in Japan. It was imperative, therefore, he said, that Japan find a supplementary source of supply of forest products for essential construction and other needs. Mr. Kobayashi pointed out that since softwoods are not available to Japan from nearby East Asiatic areas, Alaska is the closest major source of undeveloped forest resources in the free world. Mr. Kobayashi cited the fact that before World War II Japan obtained large quantities of forest products from Sakhalin and Siberia. He stressed that Japan's interest in Alaskan timber is not motivated by speculative considerations but by the need to meet Japan's serious deficit in these products.

The mission's immediate goal is to determine the feasibility of establishing a sawmill in Alaska from which substantial quantities of sawn lumber could be exported to Japan. Consideration has also been given by the mission to the possibility of the establishment in Alaska at a later date of an integrated pulp mill to meet Japan's pulp requirements. Mr. Kobayashi also explored with American authorities the possibility of utilizing Japanese labor in Alaska should it prove feasible to establish a sawmill and pulpmill there.

The restrictions of the immigration laws covering the migration of foreign workers into the United States were carefully reviewed. It appeared that it would be extremely difficult under the law to permit foreign workers to enter the country to participate in the cutting and produc-



tion of wood products in Alaska. It was explained the employment opportunities involved in any such project would have to be filled by available American labor before consideration could be given to use of workers from any other country. It appears that American manpower would in fact be available for labor demands that might emerge from the project under discussion.

The Forest Service has outlined to the Japanese mission the conditions under which timber is sold from the Tongass National Forest in Southeast Alaska and the possibilities for expansion in the production of various classes of forest products. The opportunities for procurement of lumber from the mills now established in Alaska were outlined. It was made clear that all exploration by the Japanese of the possibilities of obtaining forest products from Alaska should be made on the premise that any new enterprise must be fitted into established Forest Service timber-sale policies for building up the cut of the Tongass National Forest to sustained yield-cutting capacity and for support of the economic development of the Territory. This would include compliance with the regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture which require that Alaskan national forest timber be given primary processing within the Territory.

It was pointed out to the mission that an enterprise sponsored by the Japanese for manufacture of forest products in Alaska for shipment to Japan would have to be incorporated under American laws, bid successfully for national forest timber, and conform to all the applicable laws, regulations, and contract terms in the same manner as its possible competitors.

The Japanese have indicated that they propose to send a technical mission to Alaska in the near future to make detailed investigations of the advisability of organizing a sawmill enterprise to operate under the conditions outlined by the Forest Service. Although the mission expressed an interest in the possibility of establishing a pulp-mill in Alaska, it indicated that the large investment required for a pulp-production project would be deferred until it has obtained satisfactory experience in Alaskan timber through a sawmill enterprise.

Members of the Japanese mission now in Washington other than Mr. Kobayashi are Shinichi Tanaka, Executive Director, Council for Integrated Countermeasures for Forest Resources, and Dr. Koichi Aki, Vice Director, Resources Council, Prime Minister's Office, Tokyo.

The mission's discussions have been with officials of the State, Labor, and Interior Departments, with the Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture, and other agencies.

## Japanese War Criminals Board

Press release 794 dated October 9

The Board of Clemency and Parole for War Criminals set up by the President on September 4, 1952, by Executive Order 10393,<sup>1</sup> is organized and in operation. The Board consists of Conrad E. Snow, Assistant Legal Adviser in the Department of State, Chairman; James V. Bennett, Director of the United States Bureau of Prisons, Department of Justice, and Roger Kent, General Counsel, Department of Defense.

The Board meets weekly at the office of the Chairman in the Department of State and is presently considering recommendations which have been received from the Government of Japan for clemency for, or parole of Japanese war criminals. The Board is authorized by Executive Order 10393 to make the necessary investigations in, and advise the President with respect to, such recommendations. In making its investigations the Board may examine witnesses and take testimony to the extent deemed necessary or advisable. The Board will be ready now to consider the views of anyone interested in the subject.

The Board will have before it recommendations made by the Japanese Government, under the authority of the Treaty of Peace, for clemency or parole for Japanese war criminals who are now in prison in Japan. Under the treaty, Japan has agreed to carry out the sentences imposed upon these Japanese nationals by the United States, and the power to grant clemency and to parole may not be exercised except on decision of the U.S. Government and on the recommendation of Japan. The Board of Clemency and Parole for War Criminals appointed by the President will recommend to the President the action which should be taken on each Japanese recommendation.

The Board now has before it Japanese recommendations for parole in 72 cases of Japanese officers, soldiers, and civilians who are serving sentences in Sugamo Prison of from 8 to 25 years each for mistreatment of prisoners of war or other atrocities during World War II. Most of the cases recommended have now served 6 or 7 years of their sentences and all of them are eligible for parole under the parole system set up by General MacArthur while he was Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan. Prior to the coming into effect of the Treaty of Peace, some 300 war criminals convicted by the United States after serving one-third of their sentence had been released on parole under General MacArthur's parole system. None have been released since the termination of the occupation, although Japanese law, subject to U.S. approval, has provided a parole system identical with that of General MacArthur's.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Sept. 15, 1952, p. 409.

## Economic Development Program in Burma

Press release 792 dated October 9

Frank N. Trager of New York City has been appointed as Director of the Point Four Program in Burma, the Department of State announced on October 9. Mr. Trager took his oath of office on that date.

Mr. Trager went to Burma in October 1951 as deputy chief of the economic-assistance program then administered by the Economic Cooperation Administration (now the Mutual Security Agency). At the direction of Congress, MSA transferred responsibility for the Burma program to the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) on July 1, 1952. Mr. Trager has been acting as country director since then. He has been in Washington for the past few weeks for consultations with TCA officials and will return to Rangoon this month.

The Point Four Program in Burma is being geared into Burma's own 8-year economic program for self-sufficiency. First elements of the Burmese program were announced by Prime Minister U Nu in August. The program was drafted with the help of private American engineering consultants. It calls for a level of national output by 1959 about 100 percent above the present level and about 20 percent above the level of 1938-39. In terms of 1951-52 dollars, Burma's gross national product in 1938-39 would have been approximately 1.1 billion dollars. Now it is only 700 million dollars. The development program seeks a gross national product by 1959, in terms of 1951-52 dollars, of about 1.5 billion dollars.

The cost of the Burma development program is estimated at 1.5 billion dollars of which Burma expects to be able to provide at least 1.1 billion from its own resources. The remaining 400 million dollars would come from private investments, loans, and grants. The plan contemplates the restoration, modernization, and expansion of agricultural and forest production; the development of new industry using domestic agricultural, forest, and mineral resources; and the improvement of health and education on a Nation-wide basis.

The ECA/MSA program in fiscal years 1951 and 1952 made available to Burma approximately 24 million dollars. Most of this was earmarked for the rehabilitation of devastated ports and irrigation systems and for the purchase of capital and consumer goods needed in a war-torn society. Approximately 14 million dollars of the ECA/MSA

funds were spent for goods and services to be delivered during this fiscal year, so that the supply pipeline will be full for some time, even though the Point Four budget for the present fiscal year amounts to only 7 million dollars.

A 12-man technical mission under M. A. Raschid, Minister of Housing and Labor, is in Washington conferring with Point Four Administrator Stanley Andrews and other U.S. Government officials on the ways in which Point Four can support Burma's program most effectively.

Burma's major objective in agriculture is to restore, in the next 5 years, its prewar level of rice exports of 3.5 million tons. Rice production now permits exports of approximately 1.5 million tons. Burma proposes to reclaim for cultivation 2.5 million acres of land lost to weeds and jungle during the war and to open up to cultivation for the first time 1.4 million acres of new land. This will require mechanization for land clearing as well as cultivation. Along with this program will go land resettlement, farm credit, agricultural research and extension, rural health, and education. Point Four is prepared to supply technicians and some equipment for training and demonstration purposes.

Burma's teak production is less than 25 percent of the prewar level and the country has many other species of commercially valuable timber. To rebuild the forest-products industry will also require mechanization. Burma lost two-thirds of its elephant power during World War II, and it takes 18 years to raise and train a logging elephant. Point Four is prepared to help Burma build up a skilled timber-industry labor force by demonstration and training in the use of modern logging and processing equipment.

It has been estimated that as many as half of Burma's 18 million people suffer from malaria. Point Four is carrying on work begun by ECA/MSA in malaria control, supplying DDT and training public-health teams for campaigns throughout the country. Point Four has also joined the Burman Government in programs to improve village sanitation, restore hospitals, and train public-health and professional medical personnel.

At present Burma lacks a sufficient number of skilled men to carry out its own development program. At Burma's request Point Four is participating in a broad and varied education program which includes the training of teachers for elementary and secondary education, particularly in vocational fields; the training of agricultural technicians, engineers, and industrial supervisors; and adult education.

## Values at Stake in Settlement of Kashmir's Status

*Statement by Frank P. Graham*

*U. N. Representative for India and Pakistan*<sup>1</sup>

*The Security Council discussions on Kashmir were resumed in New York on October 10. At the opening meeting Frank P. Graham made an introductory statement in which he explained his efforts at negotiation over the last 18 months and appealed to the parties to reach a final settlement of this long-standing dispute. The Pakistan representative thanked Dr. Graham for his recent efforts and suggested that the Council recess for a few days to consider his statement. No other speeches were made; the President of the Council announced he would confer with the members and the parties on a date for a future meeting.*

U.N. doc. S/PV.605  
Dated October 10

[Excerpts]

In seeking to carry out the responsibilities entrusted to him by the Security Council, namely, to aid the parties in reaching an agreement on a plan of demilitarization, the United Nations representative proposed a 12 point programme of demilitarization as one step in the solution of a complex problem. He wishes to make clear to the Members of the Council that the narrowing of the differences on the twelve point programme to one main point, upon which the whole plan depends, emphasizes the depth of the difference on this point. As we have sought to remove many obstacles, surmount boulders, and to narrow and more precisely to define the differences, the remaining difference on the issue of the number and character of forces is still deep. It is related to the differing conceptions of the two Governments, often set forth—and I cite the UNCRP Interim Report, Security Council Records, Fourth Year, Special Supplement 7, S/1430/Rev. 1, pp. 37-39; and UNRIP Report to Security Council, 15 October 1951, par. 35—relating to (1) the status of the State of

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Security Council on Oct. 10 as a supplement to his fourth report to the Council. For excerpts from the report, submitted Sept. 16, see BULLETIN of Oct. 20, 1952, p. 626.

Jammu and Kashmir, (2) the nature of the responsibilities of the appropriate authorities on each side of the cease-fire line after demilitarization, and (3) the obligations of the two Governments under the two agreed Resolutions of 13 August 1948 and of 5 January 1949 with its provisions for a plebiscite. Upon the acceptance of definite provisions for a plebiscite came the cessation of fighting. Under the two resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 the consideration of the conditions and requirements for a free, fair and secure plebiscite would proceed in part from the studies of the Plebiscite Administrator.

Toward reaching an agreement on the remaining difference on Proposal 7 the United Nations representative made his suggestion for alternative approaches either (1) through the establishment of the number and character of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization or (2) through the declared policy that the number and character of such forces should be determined in accordance with the requirements of each area and, accordingly, that principles or criteria should be established which would serve as guidance for the civil and military representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan in the meeting contemplated in the Provisional Clause of the revised proposals.



The settlement of the Kashmir dispute involves the preservation of the existing cease-fire line, a proposed agreement on demilitarization, and certainly not less important, the requirements and conditions for holding the plebiscite. The peaceful settlement of the whole complex Kashmir problem is important for the State, for both nations, and for all nations.

To fail to solve the Kashmir problem rather than to bridge present differences is inconceivable as a practical policy in the face of a situation heavily charged with long-accumulated high potentials. The peoples of the subcontinent have the opportunity to challenge the peoples of the world with their own adventurous programmes for both individual freedom and the general welfare, for both national security and world peace. For the peoples of the subcontinent to fail to solve peacefully the Kashmir problem and to drift or stumble into greatly increased danger rather than bridge the chasm which divides them would be a tragedy for the two nations and for the people of the world who look with hope to the humane leadership of two great peoples. Programmes which now provide sustenance, freedom and hope for hundreds of millions of people might give way to violence. At this important and critical time in the history of the subcontinent, an agreement on Kashmir could be a great demonstration for peace by peace-minded leaders, whose position for peace would be re-enforced by an agreement. In case of conflict and destruction, fear and hunger might stalk the villages where the people mainly live in the hopeful lands between the mountains and the seas. Violence and then tyranny might seek to feed on hunger and hate while humane programmes were engulfed in the deep catastrophe.

The values of an early settlement of this dispute would, in my view, be tremendous for (1) the four million people of the State, (2) the four hundred million people of the two nations involved, and (3) the people of the world.

A settlement of this dispute would mean that the status of the people of the State would be finally determined not by the sovereignty of princes but by the sovereignty of the people, not by the might of armies but by the will of the people, not by bullets but by ballots, through self-determination of peoples by the democratic method of an impartial plebiscite conducted with due regard for the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations.

A settlement of this dispute might help to settle the dispute over evacuee property. It might thus help bring adjustment of the claim of the hosts of refugees who, in their tragic trek and counter-trek

from one country to the other, left behind their homes and their property and yet carried in their minds and hearts the horrors of communal slaughter. These adjustments in belated justice would assuage some of the pain of their losses and memories and contribute much to the morale and productive energies of millions of people in both nations.

Moreover, the settlement of the Kashmir dispute would contribute much to the relief of the fears and tensions over canals and rivers from which come the waters for the fields, and the hopes of food and opportunity for millions of people. A settled basis for the co-operative development of the natural resources of the rivers and their wide valleys would make more promptly and broadly possible the connecting of the engines of production, transportation, and communication with nature's ceaseless cycle of mighty but unharnessed power between the sun and the seas, between the mountains, the snows, the rains and the rivers, between the clouds and the lands of the vast subcontinent.

Food and freedom, goods and equal opportunity, health and education, dynamic hope and the liberation of the human spirit for the good life of these great, free societies can thus become the way of life for the peoples of India and Pakistan with all their meaning to the peoples of the world.

The co-operation of India and Pakistan in the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, in the self-determination of the people of the State, and in the larger release of budgets into constructive programmes, might become one of the turning points in the history of our times toward the co-operation of all nations for the larger self-determination of all peoples; toward universal disarmament and the harnessing of atomic power for the moral equivalent of war in the campaigns against poverty, illiteracy and disease; and toward the more effective co-ordination of the national programmes, the point IV programme, the Colombo Plan and the United Nations Technical Assistance programme for advances in agriculture and industry, health and education, freedom and peace, for all people.

On the subcontinent of Asia is a juncture of the forces of strategic geography, historic peoples, high traditions, ancient religions, humane leadership, fresh currents of national freedom and democratic power of high potential for peace or conflict, weal or woe, in the present world. May the prompt, fair and peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute by the Governments of India and of Pakistan set the example, provide the leadership and point the way from fear and conflict to peace and hope for the peoples of the earth.

## Recent Developments in the Kashmir Dispute

by Frank D. Collins

On September 16 Frank P. Graham, U.N. representative for India and Pakistan, submitted his fourth report to the Security Council covering the results of his negotiations with India and Pakistan at New York from May 29 to July 30 and at Geneva from August 26 to September 10.<sup>1</sup>

From his appointment on April 30, 1951, to the conclusion of the recent Geneva talks, Dr. Graham has concentrated his efforts on bridging the differences between India and Pakistan over the question of the demilitarization of Kashmir preparatory to the holding of a plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations.

When India and Pakistan attained independence and dominion status on August 15, 1947, the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was one of about 560 such states whose status was left undetermined. Under the Indian Independence Act, these states could decide whether to join India or Pakistan. For most of these states, geographical proximity to one of the dominions, as well as preponderance of either Hindu or Moslem population, made the decision relatively easy. Since Kashmir lies between India and Pakistan and has a mixed population, it became the scene of armed conflict soon after partition.

In January 1948 the dispute was brought before the Security Council and in this month the Council established the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). A year later UNCIP succeeded in obtaining the agreement of both India and Pakistan to a cease-fire and to the general principles under which a truce (i.e., a plan for the withdrawal of the armed forces from the area) and a plebiscite under U.N. auspices might be carried out. This agreement was formalized in the "UNCIP resolution" of January 5, 1949. On March 21, 1949, the U.N. Secretary-General named Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz as administrator of the projected plebiscite to be held under the terms of the January 5 resolution.

<sup>1</sup> U.N., doc. S/2783 dated Sept. 19; for excerpts, see BULLETIN of Oct. 20, p. 626.

During 1949 and 1950 UNCIP, Gen. Andrew G. L. McNaughton of Canada, acting under special temporary authorization of the Security Council, and Sir Owen Dixon of Australia, designated as successor to UNCIP, tried unsuccessfully to bring about a settlement. In January 1951 efforts of the London Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers failed to break the impasse on demilitarization. When the Security Council met on February 21, 1951, the United States joined the United Kingdom in submitting a joint draft resolution.<sup>2</sup> The resolution provided for the appointment of another U.N. representative to succeed Sir Owen Dixon and instructed him to effect demilitarization on the basis of the proposals made by Sir Owen, with appropriate modifications, and to present to India and Pakistan detailed plans for carrying out a plebiscite. The representative was directed to report to the Security Council 3 months after undertaking negotiations with the governments on the subcontinent.

To accomplish this task the draft resolution authorized the new representative to take into account such possibilities as (1) the provision of U.N. Forces to facilitate demilitarization and the holding of a plebiscite; (2) the assignment to the loser in the plebiscite of local areas, contiguous to its frontier, in which the vote had been overwhelmingly in the loser's favor; (3) different degrees of supervision as might be appropriate in different areas. Finally, the resolution called upon both India and Pakistan to accept arbitration on all unresolved points which remained after their discussions with the U.N. representative and which the latter designated as points of difference.

Both parties objected to certain parts of the resolution. Pakistan objected to the clause concerning boundary adjustments because it could mean a partial partition and was, in Pakistan's view, a contravention of the January 5, 1949, agree-

<sup>2</sup> For Ernest A. Gross' statement on that occasion, see *ibid.*, Mar. 5, 1951, p. 394.

ment. India took exception to a number of aspects of the resolution, particularly the provisions for arbitration and for the possible entry of U.N. troops. As a result of the objections by both sides, the United States and the United Kingdom presented on March 21 a revised resolution which directed the U.N. representative to effect demilitarization on the basis of the January 5, 1949 resolution to which both parties had agreed. This new draft, however, retained in its preamble the original reference to the Kashmir Constituent Assembly and also included the arbitration provision. Pakistan accepted the resolution, but India rejected it. The Security Council approved the resolution (S/2017/Rev. 1) on March 30, 1951, by a vote of 8 to 0 with three abstentions (India, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia).<sup>3</sup>

On April 30 the Council appointed Dr. Graham, former U.S. Senator from North Carolina, as U.N. representative for India and Pakistan. Thus began the most recent phase of the Kashmir negotiations. These negotiations fall into four periods, at the end of each of which Dr. Graham reported to the Security Council.

#### First Report, July–October 1951

On October 15 Dr. Graham submitted his first report to the Security Council.<sup>4</sup> When he arrived on the subcontinent in July, he reported, he found an atmosphere of hostility. The press in both India and Pakistan had begun a barrage of charges and countercharges which had given rise to considerable tension. Dr. Graham decided to adopt the procedure of separate, informal conversations with officials of the two governments. On September 7 he submitted a 12-point draft proposal on demilitarization to the governments and requested their comments. He was able to obtain the agreement of the parties to four of the 12 points. (It should be mentioned that both parties had previously committed themselves to these four points under the January 5, 1949 agreement.) In addition to reaffirming their determination not to resort to force, to avoid warlike statements, and to observe the cease-fire the parties reaffirmed their acceptance of the principle that the question of the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under U.N. auspices. The points of difference under the remaining eight proposals, according to Dr. Graham, centered around the period of demilitarization, the withdrawal of troops, the size of the forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line, and the question of whether a date should be set for the formal induction of the Plebiscite Administrator. Dr. Graham reported that because of the situation pre-

vailing on the subcontinent, he had not been able to effect demilitarization within the prescribed time limit. He added, however, that agreement was still possible, and suggested that the Security Council consider instructing him to implement its decision by continuing the negotiations with the two governments, such negotiations to be carried out at the seat of the Council. Dr. Graham suggested that he be instructed to report to the Security Council again within 6 weeks from the time negotiations were resumed.

On October 18 Dr. Graham made a statement to the Security Council<sup>5</sup> explaining his report and paying high tribute to the late Pakistan Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, who had been assassinated 2 days earlier at Rawalpindi, Pakistan. Later in the month the Security Council moved to Paris, where discussions were resumed on November 10. At this meeting the United States joined the United Kingdom in sponsoring a resolution<sup>6</sup> which noted with approval the basis for a program of demilitarization put forward by Dr. Graham, and instructed him to continue his efforts to obtain agreement on a demilitarization plan. In addition, the resolution instructed Dr. Graham to report to the Security Council within 6 weeks, giving his views on the problems confided to him. The resolution was approved by a vote of 9 to 0 with two abstentions (India and U.S.S.R.).

#### Second Report, November–December 1951

On December 18 Dr. Graham reported the results of his 6-week negotiations at Paris.<sup>7</sup> He stated that his procedure had been, first, to try to reach an agreement between the parties on his 12-point proposals of September 7, 1951. Failing this, he hoped to obtain each party's plans for demilitarization under the UNCRR resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949, in order to establish the points of difference in interpretation and execution of those resolutions that must be resolved before such demilitarization could be carried out.

Under the first point of that procedure Dr. Graham had endeavored to narrow the differences to two fundamental issues:

(1) the minimum number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the demilitarization period;

(2) the date on which the Government of India would cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be inducted into office.

On December 7 Dr. Graham presented to the parties a statement and questionnaires relating to these issues. Informal conversations were held

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, May 5, 1952, p. 713.

<sup>4</sup> U.N. doc. S/2375; for excerpts, see *ibid.*, Nov. 5, 1951, p. 738.

<sup>5</sup> U.N. doc. S/PV 564; for excerpts, see *ibid.*, p. 740.

<sup>6</sup> U.N. doc. S/2390; for text, see *ibid.*, Dec. 10, 1951, p. 959.

<sup>7</sup> U.N. doc. S/2448; for excerpts, see *ibid.*, Jan. 14, 1952, p. 52.



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

*The international boundaries shown on this map do not necessarily correspond in all cases to the boundaries recognized by the U. S. Government.*

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
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separately with the two delegations by Gen. Jacob Devers, U.N. military adviser to Dr. Graham. Dr. Graham reported that the disparity between the number and character of the forces which each party proposed should be left at the end of the demilitarization period had been so wide that agreement on the whole plan could not be reached at that stage. In addition, agreement on the important question concerning the date of induction of the Plebiscite Administrator could not be obtained. The Indian Government had insisted that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed as soon as conditions in the state permitted of a start being made with the arrangements for carrying out a plebiscite. The Pakistan Government had attached much importance to the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator to office "as much in advance of the final day of demilitarization as possible."

Dr. Graham pointed out that agreement had been obtained on 4 more of his 12 demilitarization proposals of September 7, 1951, and suggested some revisions of the 4 remaining points, i. e., proposals 5, 6, 7, and 10. Of these the most significant was his revision of proposal 7 on troop numbers; he suggested that "... there will remain on each side of the cease-fire line the lowest possible number of armed forces based in proportion on the number of armed forces existing on each side of the cease-fire line on January 1, 1949."

The Security Council resumed its hearings on January 17, 1952. On that date Dr. Graham formally submitted his report and after discussing his negotiations made a strong plea to India and Pakistan to arrive at a settlement of this long standing dispute. He stated his view that agreement on proposals 7 and 10 (troop numbers and date of appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator) would be the linchpin binding all 12 proposals together in an effectively integrated program and would prepare the way for the plebiscite. "The plebiscite," Dr. Graham stated, "would keep the promise made to the people of Jammu and Kashmir, who are worthy of the right of their own self-determination through a free, secure, and impartial plebiscite." (U.N. doc. S/PV 570.) He remarked further:

The people of Jammu and Kashmir through a free and impartial plebiscite would signal through the darkness of these times a ray of hope that not by bullets but by ballots, not through the conflict of armies but through cooperation of peoples, is the enduring way for people to determine their own destiny and way of life . . . . On the subcontinent of India and Pakistan today, the place, the time, the opportunity and the leadership have met in one of the great junctures of human history, for the possible weal or woe of the peoples of the world.

Immediately following the introductory statement by Dr. Graham, Jacob Malik, the U.S.S.R. representative, indicated he would like to speak briefly. His statement came after the Soviet Union had maintained a virtual silence for 4 years in the Security Council on the Kashmir question.

After noting that the United States and the United Kingdom had been particularly active in the Council's consideration of the Kashmir issue, Mr. Malik stated:

What is the reason why the Kashmir question is still unsettled and why the plans put forward by the United States of America and the United Kingdom in connection with Kashmir have proved fruitless from the point of view of a settlement of the Kashmir question? It is not difficult to understand that the explanation of this is chiefly and above all that these plans in connection with Kashmir are of an annexationist, imperialist nature, because they are not based on the effort to achieve a real settlement. The purpose of these plans is interference by the United States of America and the United Kingdom in the internal affairs of Kashmir, the prolongation of the dispute between India and Pakistan on the question of Kashmir and the conversion of Kashmir into a protectorate of the United States of America and the United Kingdom under the pretext of rendering it "assistance through the United Nations." Finally, the purpose of these plans in connection with Kashmir is to secure the introduction of Anglo-American troops into the territory of Kashmir and convert Kashmir into an Anglo-American colony and a military and strategic base. . . .

The United States of America and the United Kingdom are taking all steps to exclude a settlement of the question of the status of Kashmir by means of a free and unconstrained declaration by the people of Kashmir themselves. When in October 1950 it became known that the General Council of the "All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference" had adopted a resolution recommending the convening of a Constituent Assembly for the purpose of determining the future shape and affiliations of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the United States of America and the United Kingdom immediately interfered in the matter so as not to allow the people of Kashmir to decide their own future and determine the affiliations of their country independently. They hastened to foist upon the Security Council a resolution in which it was stated that the convening of a Constituent Assembly in Kashmir and any action that Assembly might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of Kashmir or any part thereof would not constitute a disposition of Kashmir. . . .

The U. S. S. R. representative concluded by proposing the following solution:

The U.S.S.R. Government considers that the Kashmir question can be resolved successfully only by giving the people of Kashmir an opportunity to decide the question of Kashmir's constitutional status by themselves, without outside interference. This can be achieved if that status is determined by a Constituent Assembly democratically elected by the Kashmir people. . . .

Both the U.S. and U.K. representatives challenged the Soviet charges. Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the U.K. representative, stated:

I should merely like to say that the really extraordinary fantasies apparently entertained by our Soviet friend and colleague in regard to the Kashmir dispute are typical, as I think, of the whole Soviet approach to international problems. Whatever the dispute before us, the first thing to do is, it seems, to discover how and why it is part of an anti-Soviet plot designed merely to advance the cause of the ruling circles of the United States and of the United Kingdom with the object of clamping down an Anglo-American domination or dictatorship on a suffering world. Any attempt by the Security Council to deal with the dispute by applying principles of reason must, unless, of course, it is concurred in by the Soviet Government, be viewed in the



light of those general principles; and it is by such a process of reasoning, if it can indeed be so termed, that the Soviet Government comes to the conclusion that, for instance, the Kashmir dispute has been invented and subsequently carefully fostered by the diabolical Anglo-Americans for the one end of turning Kashmir into an Anglo-American armed camp full of imperialistic troops destined for an eventual invasion of the Soviet Union.

No doubt there are people who can be persuaded to believe this, just as there are people who could believe that, for instance, a United Nations mission to Antarctica to study the habit of penguins could only be an indirect slander on totalitarianism or on a Marxist society. It is possible to believe that; and people, indeed, can always be found who will believe anything. But when it comes to accusing our friend, Mr. Graham, of being the secret agent of the Pentagon—well, that should, I think, cause even the most ingenuous to sit up and think and think. . . .

Surely the Kashmir dispute is capable of being considered with some degree of objectivity, and surely the dictates of reason, if they are firmly and consistently fostered by this Council, will, one day, succeed in enabling the two great nations involved to agree on a settlement which will be satisfactory to both and which will, or which may, relieve even the Soviet Union of the nightmares which now seem to surround its contemplation of this long-standing dispute. . . .

The U.S. representative, Ambassador Ernest A. Gross, associated himself with the remarks of the U.K. representative and further observed:

The attacks on Mr. Graham do not merit a reply and do not require a denial. The dispute between India and Pakistan regarding Kashmir is one which my government earnestly hopes to see settled in accordance with United Nations principles and in accordance with agreements already reached between the parties. I think it would serve no useful purpose to continue the debate at this time. The business before the Security Council, as the representative of the United Kingdom has already said, is to give the most careful and respectful consideration to the report which has just been given to us by the representative of the Council. My Government will give it the attention which it deserves.

At the meeting of the Security Council on January 30 Sir Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, spoke in part as follows:

At the meeting of the Security Council held on January 17, 1952, a representative of the U.S.S.R. referred to certain press reports relating to the granting of military bases in Kashmir to the United States. I wish to state clearly and with authority that these reports relied upon by him for his statement are utterly false and without any foundation whatsoever. We have neither been asked for, nor have we offered, any military or other bases to the U.S. or any other power. . . .

Throughout this controversy, India, Pakistan, and the Security Council have been agreed that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan or India should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. This fundamental principle is embodied in the preamble to the Security Council Resolution of April 21, 1948, and in clause I of the Commission's Resolution of January 5, 1949. (U.N. doc. S/PV 571.)

Sir Gladwyn then stated his Government's view that Dr. Graham should pay a further visit to the subcontinent to attempt to bring about a solution of the two outstanding points of difference. Am-

bassador Gross supported this suggestion, as did the majority of the Security Council members.

The following day, the Indian representative, Mr. Motilal Setalvad, expressed India's willingness to continue the discussions under Dr. Graham's direction and stated:

I have already declared that India is anxious to settle the Kashmir dispute quickly and peacefully. This is so not only because India is anxious that the people of Jammu and Kashmir should have an opportunity, without further delay, to determine freely their own future, but also because we most earnestly desire to prepare the way for firm and lasting friendship with our neighbor, Pakistan. It is no less to our interest than to the interest of Pakistan, and to the interest of the world, that these two countries which have so much in common should live side by side in complete amity, each fully sovereign but both fully and wholeheartedly in cooperation in the pursuit of the common task of peace and progress. This is no language of convention but the free expression of a deep and sincere sentiment. It seems to be the sense of the Council that the negotiations should be continued under the auspices of the U.N. representative to find a settlement of the differences that still divide India and Pakistan over certain parts of Mr. Graham's plan. India has no objection to this course and would cooperate in finding a settlement in the spirit that I have just described. (U.N. doc. S/PV 572.)

The President of the Security Council, Jean Chauvel, speaking as the representative of France, stated that "it was the sense" of the Security Council that the U.N. representative, acting under the resolutions of March 30, 1951, and November 10, 1951, was authorized without any new decision by the Council to continue his efforts to fulfill his mission and submit his report, which the Council hoped would be final within 2 months. The Soviet representative objected to this decision and indicated that "if such a proposal or conclusion is submitted to a vote the delegation of the Soviet Union will abstain."

### Third Report, December 1951–April 1952

Following this Security Council debate and some discussions in Paris with the parties, Dr. Graham departed for New Delhi, where he arrived on February 29 and remained until March 25. His third report was submitted to the Security Council on April 22, 1951.<sup>8</sup>

At New Delhi Dr. Graham continued his previous procedure of separate negotiations with the parties, having concluded that a meeting with representatives of the two Governments was inadvisable before sufficient preliminary agreement had been reached to insure positive results from a joint conference. This round of negotiations had two purposes: To assist the parties in removing the obstacles still blocking agreement on the proposals submitted to them and to obtain, if possible, further withdrawals of troops from the state of Jammu and Kashmir on both sides of the cease-fire line.

<sup>8</sup> U.N. doc. S/2611; for excerpts, see *ibid.*, May 5, 1952, p. 712.

He reported that the Government of India maintained its position concerning the minimum number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, i. e., 21,000 regular Indian army forces plus 6,000 state militia, on the Indian side and, on the Pakistan side, a force of 4,000 men normally resident in Azad Kashmir territory, half of whom should be followers of Azad Kashmir. The Indian Government, Dr. Graham stated, considered that the questions of a definite period for demilitarization and of a date for the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator could be settled without difficulty, provided agreement was reached on the scope of demilitarization and the number of forces to remain at the end of the demilitarization period.

Pakistan, Dr. Graham stated, accepted the four remaining points of his 12-point demilitarization proposals, i. e., 5, 6, 7, and 10, with certain qualifications regarding the character of the forces to be demilitarized. In his view the demilitarization of the state had reached a stage at which further reductions of troops were directly related to the preparation of a plebiscite. Accordingly, he deemed it necessary that the Plebiscite Administrator-designate should be associated with him in his studies and the consideration of common problems. Dr. Graham recommended that both parties should undertake to reduce the forces under their control in the state and that the U.N. representative's negotiations with the two Governments should be continued with a view to

(a) resolving the remaining difficulties on the 12 proposals submitted to the parties, with special reference to the number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, and

(b) the general implementation of the UNCIP resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949.

#### **Fourth Report, May-September 1952**

Dr. Graham, in a letter dated May 29, 1952, informed the President of the Security Council that, in agreement with the Governments of India and Pakistan, the negotiations on the question of the state of Jammu and Kashmir had been renewed and that at the appropriate moment he would report to the Council on the outcome of that phase of negotiations.

His fourth report, submitted on September 16, detailed the recent round of negotiations held at New York and Geneva. He had first attempted to bridge the remaining differences between the parties by proposing bracketed figures of 3,000 to 6,000 armed forces on Pakistan's side and 12,000 to 18,000 on the Indian side to break the deadlock on the number of troops. As he was unable to obtain agreement on this suggestion, he submitted another

draft proposal on September 2 which fixed the figures at 6,000 and 18,000 excluding Gilgit and Northern Scouts on the Pakistan side and the state militia on the Indian side. Pakistan accepted this proposal, with certain reservations; India did not.

Concluding that he could not obtain agreement on fixed figures, Dr. Graham decided it might be possible for the two Governments to agree on certain principles which could serve as criteria for fixing the number of forces in a conference of civil and military representatives of both sides. Instead of including a fixed troop quantum, his new proposal, presented on September 4, provided that the minimum number of forces to be maintained on each side of the cease-fire line be defined as those "required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite." In the case of India, the proposal added the phrase "with due regard to the security of the state" and expanded the term "forces" to include "Indian forces and state armed forces."

Dr. Graham reported the following reaction of the parties to this proposal: India, although it believed that the proposal contained "the germs of a settlement," indicated it could not accept any equation of its responsibilities with those of the local authorities on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line and insisted that the defense of the entire state is the concern of India. Pakistan objected to certain clauses in the proposals which it suggested should be eliminated to avoid the recurrence of political controversies.

Dr. Graham stated that it was evident after 2 weeks of discussion at Geneva that agreement could not be reached on any of the revised drafts he presented. He attributed the differences in the positions of the parties to their differing concepts of their status in the state and stressed the importance of the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator, a matter which he termed "the heart of the integrated program for demilitarization and a plebiscite." He concluded by expressing the view that to reach an agreement on a plan of demilitarization it is necessary either:

(a) to establish the character and number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization; or

(b) to declare that the forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization should be determined in accordance with the requirements of each area, and, accordingly, principles or criteria should be established which would serve as guidance for the civil and military representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan in the meeting contemplated in the Provisional Clause of the revised proposals.

• *Mr. Collins, author of the above article, is an officer in the Office of South Asian Affairs.*

## Report of U. N. Command Operations in Korea

### FORTY-SEVENTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD JUNE 1-15, 1952<sup>1</sup>

U.N. doc. S/2774  
Transmitted Sept. 15, 1952

I herewith submit report number 47 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 June 1952, inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués numbers 1282-1296 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Plenary sessions of the Military Armistice Conferences met daily with the exception of a three-day recess from June 8th through the 10th. These meetings were again characterized by an endless repetition of Communist propaganda themes. For this reason the senior United Nations Command delegate recessed the conferences for three days with the hope that the Communists would seriously consider and accept the United Nations Command package proposal designed to attain an honourable armistice. Unfortunately the Communists returned to the conferences repeating their violent propaganda themes. In refutation of the Communist propaganda blast and to attempt to keep the discussion on germane topics, there follow fair examples of statements made by the senior United Nations Command Delegate.

From the proceedings of June 14th:

After days, weeks and months of negotiating terms for an armistice, the end of April saw only three remaining issues to be resolved—namely, the questions of rehabilitation of airfields, the composition of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the exchange of prisoners of war. In an honest and sincere effort to effect an early cessation of hostilities, the United Nations Command made its compromise proposal of 28 April. The concessions made by our side in this final offer were of great magnitude, and we stated clearly and specifically that no substantive changes would be made thereto. The current

deadlock in the armistice talks has been brought about by your inhuman and truculent demands on the prisoners of war issue.

During the sessions in this tent, our side has patiently and carefully explained its fair and humane position on the exchange of prisoners. We have pointed out repeatedly that it was with your acquiescence that our side screened the prisoners of war in its custody in order to determine the number who would not forcibly resist repatriation to your side. The result of this screening, which neither side could predetermine, was obviously a disappointment to you. Consequently, by using false allegations and distortions you have fruitlessly attempted to discredit the fairness of the screening procedures.

As further evidence of our sincere desire for peace, we have offered to permit a rescreening of prisoners of war by an international, neutral body in the demilitarized zone and witnessed by representatives of your side. Your acceptance and adherence to the results of this proposal would make possible the final settlement of these negotiations. The future welfare and happiness of thousands of soldiers and their families on both sides will be directly affected by your decision. You are charged with full responsibility for the delay in these negotiations. You cannot escape or evade this responsibility.

Our final compromise proposal is as firm and unalterable now as it was on 28 April. We will never agree to any substantive change, but at any time our side will gladly explain and clarify any provisions of this offer. If your side is ready to accept our proposal, we can proceed with the final arrangements for the signing of the Armistice; otherwise I suggest that we recess.

From the proceedings of June 7th:

The record of the staff officer meetings showing when and how the decision to screen the Prisoners of War was taken has been cited in these meetings. That record establishes clearly the full acquiescence of your side in that step. Thus the screening was undertaken in good faith and the procedure employed was scrupulously fair. Whatever the results they would have been accepted by the United Nations Command. But not so with your side. Because the results were found to be less favorable than you might have hoped, you have attempted to deny your participation in the decision to effect the screening of the prisoners of war. It is a futile effort. Prisoners were screened with your acquiescence. Once screened they had to be segregated according to their determination.

You are now attempting to compel our side to abandon these persons who with your acquiescence manifested their strong opposition to return to your side. You are seeking to compel the United Nations Command to place the lives of these persons in jeopardy by insisting that they be delivered to you by force and violence. You are motivated not by consideration of the welfare of these per-

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted to the Security Council by the representative of the U.S. to the U.N. on September 15. Texts of the 30th, 31st and 32d reports appear in the BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266; the 33d report, *ibid.*, Mar. 10, 1952, p. 395; the 34th report, *ibid.*, Mar. 17, 1952, p. 430; the 35th report, *ibid.*, Mar. 31, 1952, p. 512; the 36th and 37th reports, *ibid.*, Apr. 14, 1952, p. 594; the 38th report, *ibid.*, May 5, 1952, p. 715; the 39th report, *ibid.*, May 19, 1952, p. 788; the 40th report, *ibid.*, June 23, 1952, p. 998; the 41st report, *ibid.*, June 30, 1952, p. 1038; the 42d report, *ibid.*, July 21, 1952, p. 114; the 43d report, *ibid.*, Aug. 4, 1952, p. 194; the 44th report, *ibid.*, Aug. 11, 1952, p. 231; the 45th report, *ibid.*, Aug. 18, 1952, p. 272; and the 46th report, *ibid.*, Sept. 29, 1952, p. 495.



sons but by a desire to punish those who prefer death to return to your control. The United Nations Command will never force them to return to your control. If your refusal to recognize this results in delay in the attainment of an armistice the responsibility for such delay is yours.

On the other hand the United Nations Command does not seek to retain any prisoners of war. In order that your side may be assured that all prisoners except those who violently oppose repatriation will in fact be repatriated, our side has proposed an impartial rescreening at the prisoner of war exchange points. Your refusal to accept this completely reasonable offer shows only that you fear to confirm what the world already knows, that thousands of your personnel absolutely will not return to your control. While the United Nations Command does not seek to detain any prisoners of war it will not participate in the forced delivery of those persons who strongly refuse to be repatriated to your side.

Since we have been meeting here almost daily since the 2nd of May your side must by now be fully aware that there is no possibility that this stand of the United Nations Command will be altered. What purpose you seek to achieve by the daily reiteration of the arguments you have used since early December to oppose the United Nations Command stand of no forced repatriation is not known to our side. However, we can assure you that the continued repetition of these well known arguments will not serve to alter our position in any respect.

The bold and unscrupulous attempt of Communist Prisoner of War leaders to embarrass the United Nations Command by their capture of General Dodd served as a clear indication of the extreme limits to which they would go if given the opportunity. The rebellious and arrogant hard-core Communists had created a situation in which it was impossible for the United Nations Command properly to discharge its duties toward the prisoners of war in its custody without using forceful measures. Accordingly, the Commanding General, Eighth Army, was directed to take necessary steps to insure the attainment of uncontested control of all prisoners of war at Kojedo.

Careful and detailed plans were made to reduce the density of the Prisoner of War population at Kojedo by spreading Prisoners of War into smaller, more separated compounds. On 10 June this operation started in Compound seventy-six, one of the most violent of the Communist installations. Beginning at 0545, and continuing until United Nations Command troops entered the compound at 0615, messages were broadcast over a public address system to all prisoners advising them of the plan to move them to new areas and emphasizing that they would not be harmed if they cooperated. When it became apparent that the inmates were not going to obey the order to form into groups preparatory to movement, but instead were openly arming themselves with sharpened spears and improvised knives, troops moved in with a show of force to begin segregation.

Using tear gas, United Nations Command forces advanced to a position midway in the compound. Most of the prisoners were evacuated without difficulty, but in one corner of the compound more than 1,500 had gathered in a group. Efforts to move them were met with stubborn and fanatical resistance. By the use of tear gas and concussion grenades alone, the mob was finally brought under control. No shots were fired. Throughout the entire operation, the discipline and self-control exercised by United Nations Command troops were outstanding. Several of the Prisoner of War ringleaders who had instigated

previous riots were apprehended and segregated. By 0845 the compound was cleared. Total casualties included one U.S. enlisted man killed and fourteen others wounded; thirty-one Prisoners of War were killed and 139 wounded. It is significant to note that in the heat of the action some prisoners were seen attacking fellow prisoners.

The Commanding General, United Nations Prisoner of War Camp Number One, in a personal report to higher headquarters, stressed that he himself had given both written and oral orders to Colonel Lee Hak Koo, North Korean Communist Prisoner of War leader, to form his people in groups of 150. This order was ignored. After the compound was subdued, Lee and other leaders were segregated. A complete plan was found for Prisoner of War resistance which had been followed during the operation. Following the fall of Compound seventy-six, the remainder of the strong pro-Communist compounds were segregated and moved without resistance.

As an indication of the ruthlessness and premeditated violence which had been planned, a survey of Compound seventy-six, which held about 6,000 prisoners, revealed the following:

Prisoners were armed with about 3,000 spears, 1,000 gasoline grenades, 4,500 knives and an undetermined number of clubs, hatchets, hammers and barbed wire flails. These weapons had been covertly fashioned from scrap materials and metal-tipped tent poles over a long period of time in preparation for armed resistance.

One tunnel was under construction from Compound seventy-six to seventy-seven.

Entrenchments around each hut were connected from one building to another.

In Compound seventy-seven the bodies of sixteen murdered prisoners were found. This was the compound in which, the day prior to movement, the compound leader had assured the Camp Commander that he would insure cooperation.

As a further measure to insure adequate control, plans were being formulated for the construction of additional camps away from Kojedo to house Communist prisoners who have already been segregated for return to Communist control at such time as an exchange takes place.

Enemy action along the 140 mile battle line consisted generally of small scale attacks launched for the purpose of eliminating United Nations Command outposts or gaining intelligence. These probing efforts were unsuccessful and generally of minor significance. Toward the end of the period these attacks increased in frequency on the western front where on one occasion a battalion strength attack against United Nations Command outpost positions was repulsed only after bitter hand-to-hand fighting. This increased enemy aggressiveness was attributable to earlier United Nations Command local attacks which had wrested several forward positions from stubbornly defending enemy units. Indicative of the enemy's steadily increasing combat capabilities was the employment of over 5,000 rounds of artillery fire against elements of a United Nations Command division on the western front during a twenty-four-hour period. The enemy recently concluded the relief of two frontline Chinese Communist armies on the western front. On the central front prisoners indicate the relief of an additional Chinese Communist army.

These reliefs appear to be in conformity with the enemy's policy of rotating his units on line. Except for these reliefs hostile troop dispositions and front lines remained unchanged. In South Korea, the vigorous pursuit and elimination of dissident elements continued. As a result, the estimated strength of dissident elements has declined steadily. The present strength of these elements, 2,400, is now lower than at any time since the North Korean invasion.

The western front was the scene of the most frequent enemy contact for the period. The majority of the clashes occurred in the Mabang and Sangnyong areas where, beginning on 7 June, United Nations Command elements seized four hill masses from stubbornly defending enemy units. The enemy reacted swiftly to his losses. For several successive days, usually during the hours of darkness, the enemy launched attacks up to company size in an unsuccessful effort to retake the lost positions. The largest enemy effort was made on 11 June when hostile units, totaling a battalion, launched a three-pronged attack in the Sangnyong area. These attacks were all repulsed despite the unusually liberal quantities of artillery and mortar fire expended to support these hostile attacks.

Enemy action along the central and eastern fronts consisted of scattered probing efforts and determined counteraction to United Nations Command patrols and raiding elements. On 12 June United Nations Command elements, in a local attack, seized a position in the Kumsong area against determined enemy opposition. During the two following nights the enemy launched repeated attacks, in rapid succession, in a costly and futile attempt to regain the positions. The Yunsil area on the eastern front was the only other site of any appreciable enemy aggressiveness. In this area the enemy launched attacks of company and battalion strength on 10 and 12 June respectively. Both of these attacks terminated with the withdrawal of the hostile units.

Prisoner of war statements, hostile vehicle movement, and the steadily improving combat effectiveness demonstrated by forward enemy units make it unmistakably clear that the enemy is prepared for a continuation of hostilities. The enemy, however, has shown no definite inclination to exercise his capability for launching a major offensive. Prisoners of war still make vague references to a future hostile offensive. But as yet, there is no evidence as to when the enemy may initiate such an operation.

United Nations Command fast carriers, operating in the Sea of Japan, launched attacks against North Korean transportation facilities and supply routes. The attacks, flown by jet and propeller driven aircraft, were concentrated on enemy rail lines along the Korean east coast where numerous cuts were made. In addition, the enemy suffered destruction and damage to installations and material including railway bridges, locomotives, rail cars, military buildings, trucks, guns, highway bridges, and sampans.

United Nations Command carriers operating in the Yellow Sea furnished cover and air spot for the surface units on blockade patrols and anti-invasion stations. They also flew reconnaissance missions and offensive strikes as far north as Hanchon and into the Chinnampo area,

the Hwanghae Province and in close support of the front line troops. The bulk of the damage inflicted was on military structures. Additional destruction and damage included numerous supplies, bridges, gun positions, warehouses, boats, oxcarts and pack animals.

United Nations Command naval aircraft based ashore in Korea flew in support of friendly front line units. These missions resulted in the destruction of numerous bunkers, mortar and gun positions, personnel and supply shelters, and trucks and rails were cut in many places. One enemy fighter, of the conventional type, was shot down.

Patrol planes based in Japan conducted daylight reconnaissance missions over the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea and the Tsushima Straits. They also flew day and night anti-submarine patrols and weather reconnaissance missions for surface units in the Japan and Yellow Seas.

The naval blockade along the Korean east coast continued from the bomblines to Chongjin with surface units making day and night coastal patrols firing on key rail targets along the coastal main supply route daily. The siege by surface vessels continued at the major ports of Wonsan, Hungnam, and Songjin, subjecting the enemy forces at these ports to day and night fire.

Destruction along the east coast at Wonsan and to the north, as reported by spotting aircraft, shore fire control parties, and the firing vessels themselves, included enemy casualties, rail cars, military structures, boats, and many guns, bunkers and warehouses. Damage was extensive and rails were cut in many places.

Fire support vessels at the bomblines provided gunfire on call for the front line troops. Destruction included bunkers, military structures, gun and mortar positions, and troop and supply shelters.

On the night of 2 June, a United Nations Command armed patrol boat encountered two enemy armed picket sampans at Hon Wan Roads. The enemy crews used false surrender tactics, and as the sampans were being made fast for towing, a concealed man tossed a grenade into the friendly boat. Friendly casualties were one killed and two wounded. Of the ten enemy there were no survivors.

Enemy shore batteries were active almost daily against the blockading vessels and minesweepers all along the coast. In many instances friendly units were straddled but there were no hits or casualties reported. In each instance the battery was taken under counter fire with several guns destroyed and damaged. Minesweepers operating close inshore received machine gun and small arms fire. There were no reports of damage or casualties.

On the Korean west coast, the United Nations surface units manned blockade and anti-invasion stations along the coast from Chinnampo to the Han River Estuary, in support of the friendly islands north of the battle line. Daylight firing into enemy positions started many fires and secondary explosions, inflicted enemy casualties and destroyed numerous military shelters. Patrols into the Yalu gulf netted several sail junks destroyed and prisoners taken.

On the night of 11 June, enemy forces attacked the friendly island of Yongmae-do in the Haeju approaches, after subjecting it to artillery and mortar fire the night of 10 June. The attackers, coming across the mud flats

at low tide, were repulsed with the help of United Nations Command vessels which illuminated and fired on the attacking troops and fired on their mainland bases. A United Nations Command air force strike was called and planes were credited with many enemy casualties.

Vessels of the Republic of Korea Navy conducted close inshore patrols and blockade along both coasts and assisted United Nations Command naval forces in mine-sweeping duties.

United Nations Command minesweepers continued operations to keep the channels, gunfire support areas, and anchorages free of mines of all types. Sweepers also enlarged areas and swept close inshore as needed by the operating forces.

United Nations Command naval auxiliary vessels, Military Sea Transportation Service, and merchant vessels under contract continued to provide personnel lifts and logistic support for the United Nations Command naval, air and ground forces in Japan and Korea.

The pattern of air activity remained relatively unchanged during the period with United Nations Command air force fighter interceptors holding the upper hand in North Korea, fighter bombers continuing large scale rail cutting missions and close support sorties, light bombers making night armed reconnaissance of the enemy's main supply routes and medium bombers hitting key rail bridges. Combat cargo units performed their regular transport mission.

The fighter interceptors engaged enemy jets on five days, destroying thirteen of the Communist aircraft and damaging four others before they were able to return to their bases across the Yalu River. No United Nations Command aircraft were lost in the engagements. United Nations Command fighter interceptors are continuing to destroy Communist jets at a ratio of more than eight to one. The MIGs appeared in formations of two to ten aircraft and friendly pilots continued to observe a decrease in the number of enemy sorties. The MIG pilots again showed aggressiveness when attacking the fighter bombers, but generally broke off the fight when fighter interceptors entered the engagement. The enemy attacks were, for the most part, timed to catch the fighter bombers as they completed their bomb runs. During the early part of the period they showed some aggressiveness against the fighter interceptors. There was some indication that the MIGs were being directed by radar stations since some of their attacks were made out of the overcast.

The United Nations Command fighter bombers flew an increasing number of sorties in support of the United Nations Command ground forces. The attacks by these aircraft destroyed numerous gun positions and bunkers and inflicted heavy casualties on enemy troops.

The fighter bomber aircraft hit rail lines within a few miles of the Manchurian border with hundreds of aircraft attacking a short section of the track. The pilots' claims of numerous separate rail cuts were confirmed by photographs which showed damage which would require major repairs or the construction of by-passes.

Light bomber aircraft continued their night combat patrols over the main supply routes in North Korea to destroy truck convoys and trains and to harass repair crews

working on rail lines where fighter bombers had attacked. A new attack program was launched which concentrates the light bomber effort on only three or four main routes each night. The program is flexible and permits immediate diversion of aircraft to any routes where heavy traffic is reported.

The medium bombers were again scheduled primarily against key rail bridges on the line from Sinuiju to Sinanju and the route from Kanggye to Kunuri. Bridges on these routes were hit repeatedly, with excellent results reported. Enemy night fighters were sighted on several occasions and on the night of 10/11 June made concentrated attacks on the medium bombers but were unable to prevent them from knocking out the Kwaksan bridge.

The regular close support effort by the medium bombers each night was continued and one medium bomber was scheduled nightly to drop leaflets over North Korean cities.

United Nations Command transport aircraft were used on air evacuation missions and regular cargo runs transporting supplies and special equipment to United Nations Command naval, air and ground units in Korea. Joint air transportability exercises were conducted in Japan.

United Nations Command reconnaissance units continued to conduct visual and photographic reconnaissance along the enemy's main line of resistance, rear area troop and supply locations, main supply routes, airfields, and communication centers, obtaining Bomb Damage Assessment and Surveillance photography of these targets.

United Nations Command leaflets, radio broadcasts, and loudspeaker broadcasts continued to report the determined opposition of thousands of Chinese and North Korean prisoners to Communist demands that they be forcibly repatriated to face slavery or death at the hands of their former masters. Accounts by these prisoners, together with information contained in the Communists' own broadcasts, have been used to expose the conditions in Communist territory which have caused these prisoners to resist repatriation at all costs. On the basis of these reports, United Nations Command media have described the corruption, negligence, and incompetence of the Communist puppet regimes in China and North Korea, and the oppressive tyranny which they have imposed upon the people in the guise of fallacious reforms.

## U.S. Proposals for Elimination of Bacterial Weapons

U.N. doc. DC/15  
Dated Sept. 4, 1952

*United States of America: working paper setting forth a summary of proposals, made by the United States representative in the Disarmament Commission on 15 August 1952, for elimination of bacterial weapons in connexion with elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction*

1. A comprehensive programme for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all



armed forces and armaments should provide for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, including bacterial, and for the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

2. Bearing in mind that all Members of the United Nations have agreed to refrain not only from the use of germ warfare but from the use of force of any kind contrary to the law of the Charter, the programme envisaged in paragraph 1 must be approached from the point of view of preventing war and not from the point of view of regulating the armaments used in war or of codifying the laws of war. The programme as a whole should ensure that armed forces and armaments are reduced to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that:

(a) No State will be in a position of armed preparedness to start a war;

(b) No State shall be in a position to undertake preparations for war without other states having knowledge of such preparations long before the offending State could start a war.

3. Safeguards must be devised to ensure the elimination of bacterial weapons and facilities and appliances for their production and use along with the elimination of all armed forces and armaments not expressly permitted to States to maintain public order and to meet their Charter responsibilities. The principal safeguards to ensure the elimination of bacterial weapons are to be found in an effective and continuous system of disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments such as that suggested in the working paper submitted by the representative of the United States on 5 April 1952, entitled "Proposals for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments" (DC/C.2/1). It is proposed that at appropriate stages in an effective system of disclosure and verification agreed measures should become effective providing for the progressive curtailment of production, the progressive dismantling of plants, and the progressive destruction of stockpiles of bacterial weapons and related appliances. Under this programme, with co-operation in good faith by the principal States concerned, all bacterial weapons and all facilities and appliances connected therewith should be completely eliminated from national armaments and their use prohibited.

## International Bank Activities

### *Economic Mission to Japan*

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is sending an economic mission to Japan in response to a request from the Japanese Government, it was announced on October 20. The mission is expected to arrive in Tokyo on October

21 and will remain in Japan for approximately 2 months.

The mission consists of John C. de Wilde, economic adviser to the Bank's Department of Operations for Asia and the Middle East, who will head the mission, and William M. Gilmartin of the same Department. Japan is one of the Bank's newest member countries and this will be the first visit of Bank officials.

The mission will not consider or discuss any specific projects which may be submitted for financing by the Bank. As a normal preliminary to any subsequent consideration of lending operations, the mission will make a general appraisal of the Japanese economy. It will collect pertinent economic and financial information bearing on Japan's economic prospects and her capacity to service present and additional indebtedness. The mission will survey industrial and agricultural production and study the principal economic and financial problems which will affect the future reconstruction and development of Japan.

### *Report on Mexican Economy*

A report entitled *The Major Long-Term Trends in the Mexican Economy*, prepared by a group of economists from the Mexican Government and the International Bank, is to be published within the next few months in Spanish by the Mexican Government and in English by the International Bank, it was announced on October 17.

This study stems from a proposal made in February 1951 by the Nacional Financiera, an official financing agency of the Mexican Government, that the Mexican Government and the International Bank set up a combined working party to assess the major long-term trends in the Mexican economy with particular reference to Mexico's capacity to absorb additional foreign investments. The Combined Mexican Working Party held its first meeting in April 1951, and work on the project continued for more than a year.

The report reviews the course and effects of investment in Mexico from 1939 to 1950 and makes an assessment of the prospects for changes in the national income and the balance of payments over the next 10 years. The data contained in the report and the conclusions drawn are the responsibility of the members of the Working Party as technical experts and are in no way binding on the Mexican Government and the Bank.

The study covers every segment of the Mexican economy including agriculture, mining, petroleum, electric power, industry, and transportation and communications, as well as education, public health and welfare, and public finance. Much of the data on public finance, external debt, the balance of payments, and the estimates of national income, gross national product, consumption, and public and private investment is new and appears for the first time in this report.

## The United States in the United Nations

### General Assembly

*Additional Agenda Items*—At its plenary meeting on October 21, the General Assembly decided, on the recommendation of the General (Steering) Committee, to include the following additional items in the agenda of its seventh session:

72. Measures to avert the threat of a new world war and measures to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations.
73. Question of impartial investigation of charges of use by United Nations Forces of bacteriological warfare.

The latter item was requested by the United States. The Soviet Union in June had vetoed a Security Council resolution for impartial investigation of germ warfare charges. As was the case during the Security Council discussions, the Soviet representative now proposed simultaneous adoption of a resolution inviting representatives of the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans to participate in the General Assembly's consideration of the item. Selwyn Lloyd (U.K.) spoke in opposition to the Soviet proposal; Ernest A. Gross (U.S.) then declared:

... It is our position, as the representative of the United Kingdom has brought out, that the question of inviting the Chinese Communists or the North Koreans to participate in the consideration of this question is a problem which cannot and should not logically be raised and decided in this body, in the General Assembly. It is a question which should be left for consideration and decision in the First Committee when this item is reached for debate in that Committee. ... I cannot conclude without pointing out that the essence of the charge against the United Nations forces in Korea, the repetition of the charges, has centered in Moscow, has been deliberately planned, staged, and developed from that source, and the question which will be before the First Committee is: Who is the instigator of this false charge; whose is the responsibility for the constant attempt to poison the atmosphere, to divide, to confuse the free world and to discredit the United Nations action in Korea?

The Soviet proposal was defeated by a vote of 46-5 (Soviet bloc)-7. The Members abstaining were Argentina, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Yemen, and Burma.

On the United States request the vote was 53-5 (Soviet bloc).

The Polish request to include item 72 to the agenda was approved unanimously. The proposal

calls for an end of the Korean war, an exchange of all prisoners, withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea, the reduction by one-third of the armed forces of the great powers, unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, condemnation of NATO, a five-power peace pact, and ratification of the Geneva Protocol, *inter alia*. The U.S. delegation did not oppose placing the proposal on the agenda, since, as Ambassador Gross pointed out, "... we feel that the best way to expose a fraud is to bring it out into the market place of ideas, and men who are free to think for themselves will soon enough see the truth." He declared that:

The resolution ... is a scrap heap of discarded ideas. ... Each subject it refers to is more appropriately discussed under some other item on our agenda. The resolution is as unnecessary and stale as it is unproductive.

*Committee I (Political and Security)*—On October 23 the Committee voted unanimously to place the Korean item first on its agenda. It also voted (34-20-6) to give second and third places respectively to the questions of Tunisia and Morocco.

The opening debate on the Korean question on October 23 was marked by a lengthy discussion as to whether the North Korean government should be invited to participate. A Soviet resolution in favor of such an invitation was rejected by a vote of 38-11-8 (U.S.S.R., Soviet bloc, Burma, India, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, Yemen). The Committee decided (54-5-1) to invite the Republic of Korea to send a representative.

In a major statement on October 24 (the text of which will be printed in the issues of November 3 and November 10) Secretary Acheson traced the Korean question from the Cairo Conference in December 1943 through the recent breakdown in armistice negotiations and presented a 21-power draft resolution calling on the Chinese Communists and North Koreans to agree to an armistice based on voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war. Following is a summary of his statement:

At Cairo in 1943, the Secretary pointed out, representatives of China, the United States, and the United Kingdom pledged that, in due course, Korea should become free and independent. At Potsdam on July 26, 1945, the same three powers repeated that pledge. The Soviet Union, upon its entry into the war against Japan, adhered to

the Potsdam Declaration; it stated on August 8, 1945:

Loyal to its Allied duty, the Soviet Government has accepted the proposal of the Allies and has joined in the Declaration of the Allied Powers of 26 July.

At Moscow on December 27, 1945, the Foreign Ministers of the U.S., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R. agreed that a provisional government should be set up for all Korea with a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state.

When the Japanese surrendered in September 1945, it was necessary to arrange for the acceptance of the surrender of the Japanese forces in Korea. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers ordered that the surrender of the Japanese troops should be accepted by the U.S. military forces south of the 38th parallel and by the Soviet military forces north of the 38th parallel.

The sole purpose of that Order was to divide the area in which the surrender of defeated Japanese troops should be made to one group of officers or to another.

Immediately after the surrender, the American Military Command in Korea approached the Soviet commander and asked him to develop with the American commander a joint policy for the administration of the area as a whole as a first step in the creation of a government for all Korea and the orderly transfer of power to that Government. The Soviet commander north of the 38th parallel rejected this approach.

At the Council of Foreign Ministers at Moscow in December 1945, an agreement was reached to create a joint commission of the United States and the Soviet Union, and a joint conference of the two powers.

*U.S. Proposals in 1946.*—The Joint Conference met in January 1946, and the U.S. proposed a series of measures to advance the economic and administrative coordination of all of Korea. They provided for uniting the key public utilities creating uniform fiscal policies. The Soviet Union rejected all these proposals.

The Joint Conference met disaster early in 1946. The Joint Commission, which met in March 1946, suffered a similar fate. After it had held 24 sessions without accomplishing anything, Secretary Marshall took the matter up directly with Foreign Minister Molotov and corresponded with him about reassembling the Joint Commission. Subsequently the Commission was reconvened on the basis that there should be the broadest possible consultation with Korean groups and that no group or individual could be excluded from consultation except by mutual agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

When the Joint Commission met, however, the U.S.S.R. representatives repudiated Mr. Molotov's agreement and went back to their original position in 1946, insisting that nobody could be

consulted unless he had agreed to the trusteeship provisions.

On August 26, 1947, Robert Lovett, the Acting Secretary of State, made another effort to carry out the Moscow Agreement and the pledge made at Cairo and Potsdam. He wrote a letter to the Governments of the U.K., China, and the U.S.S.R., proposing a Four-Power conference.

The Soviet Union rejected this proposal. Since it was clear that nothing could be hoped for from bilateral discussions with the U.S.S.R., the U.S. brought the matter to the United Nations. During its second session in 1947 the General Assembly considered resolutions put forward by the Soviet Union and by the U.S., and finally adopted a resolution providing for elections for a national assembly which was to establish a national government throughout all of Korea, for subsequent withdrawal of all occupying troops, and for the establishment of a commission to carry out the U.N.'s intentions.

The U.N. Commission was set up and went to Korea. U.S. military officers who were in command south of the 38th parallel put everything at its disposal, but it was not permitted to carry out its functions in North Korea.

*Election in South Korea.*—On May 10, 1948, Korea's first democratic election took place, with 75 percent of the eligible voters south of the 38th parallel voting.

A Constituent Assembly was set up; a Constitution was worked out; elections were held for the executive officers of the Government; and on August 25 the Government of the Republic of Korea was inaugurated. By September 11, 1948, the U.S. had transferred all authority to that Government.

In accordance with the will of the General Assembly, the withdrawal of U.S. troops was completed on June 29, 1949.

The U.S.S.R. withdrew its occupying forces in 1948 but continued to exercise control in North Korea through its official representatives there, through North Korean leaders who were either citizens or one-time residents of the Soviet Union, and by the tradition of subservience inculcated during the occupation.

Efforts to subvert South Korea were carried on through political and guerrilla warfare, military pressure on the border, and ceaseless propaganda. Overt political activity ended in 1947, with the suppression of the Communist Party in South Korea.

Covert activities were continued by guerrilla forces which infiltrated into the South. In the beginning these forces were made up of South Korean Communists, but soon considerable numbers of armed North Korean Communists infiltrated into South Korea and kept up constant pres-



sure on the Korean Government. Secretary Acheson explained:

There were three main purposes in this activity. One was to lay the basis for a future attempt at an internal coup. The second was to harrass the South Korean Government and not to give it an opportunity to get on with the pressing problems of organization in the country. The third was to give the impression to the outside world of mass discontent in South Korea.

Unprovoked military incidents along the border occurred almost daily, and at least four major military operations took place before that of June 25, 1950.

In the field of propaganda, efforts to subvert the Government of South Korea took the form of appeals to South Koreans to rise up against their Government and overthrow it, and of "proposals for the peaceful unification of Korea", i. e. by the Communists.

All these efforts were completely defeated in South Korea, with the result that in the late spring of 1950, the South Korean Government, the Government of the Republic of Korea, presented the strongest attitude to the world which they had ever presented. It had defeated the Communists who had infiltrated from the north and cleaned up these pockets of rebellion within its own country. It had solidified the loyalty of its own people and established the basis of its own democratic control. It had met every attempt to invade it over its border and thrown them back. It had met all this propaganda. It is quite significant that after all these efforts had been defeated, it was only a few weeks later that the attack occurred.

According to a report of the United Nations Commission on June 25, 1950, the armed forces of the Republic of Korea consisted of 100,000 men organized into eight divisions but not armed for offensive combat.

On June 24 one day before the aggression began, the U.N. Commission had received a report from field observers who had made a complete inspection of the entire Thirty-eighth Parallel. This inspection began on June 9 and ended on June 23.

During their tour the observers were given an opportunity to see everything in South Korea along the parallel. They said that they had obtained a clear picture of the deployment, on a defensive basis, of the South Korean forces. The Commission said that on the basis of this report and of its knowledge of the general military situation,

the Commission is unanimously of the opinion that no offensive could possibly have been launched across the Parallel by the Republic of Korea on 25 June 1950.

#### **Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Oct. 10-18, 1952**

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press releases issued prior to Oct. 10 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 784 of Oct. 7, 792 of Oct. 9, 794 of Oct. 9, 800 of Oct. 10, and 802 of Oct. 10.

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*804	10/13	Death of Willard, Chief of IC
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*812	10/16	Exchange of persons
†813	10/16	Swiss-German property agmt.
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*815	10/16	For. Ser. 1952 selection boards
816	10/17	U.N. note on Soviet attack of U.S. plane
817	10/17	Congress of architects
818	10/18	Hickerson: Problems of the 7th General Assembly.
*819	10/18	Bruce: Death of Matthews

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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